Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library
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Notes 256<br />
is an obvious trade-off involved, however, because <strong>the</strong> greater <strong>the</strong> barriers to entry, <strong>the</strong> less<br />
competitive <strong>the</strong> education system as a whole will be.<br />
160 It is suggested that extra billing would be inefficient because social efficiency might<br />
militate in favour of an alternate distribution of educational resources. Allocating scarce<br />
educational resources as according to ex ante ability to pay does satisfy a prima facie<br />
utilitarian efficiency condition, but if those who are willing to pay <strong>the</strong> most are not <strong>the</strong> most<br />
able to benefit from education, long-run efficiency might not be obtained.<br />
161 This trade-off between equity and efficiency is brought out clearly in <strong>the</strong> differences<br />
between <strong>the</strong> school voucher proposals of Friedman, supra note 1 and C.Jencks, Education<br />
Vouchers: A Report on <strong>the</strong> Financing of Elementary Education by Grants to Parents<br />
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Center <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> Study of Public Policy, 1970). Friedman<br />
advocates setting <strong>the</strong> value of <strong>the</strong> basic voucher at <strong>the</strong> average per-student cost of state<br />
education (or a proportion <strong>the</strong>reof) and granting schools <strong>the</strong> ability to extra-bill freely.<br />
Jencks’ scheme is more concerned with distributive justice and would <strong>the</strong>re<strong>for</strong>e set <strong>the</strong> basic<br />
voucher at <strong>the</strong> full per-student average cost of state education and would provide an<br />
additional increment on <strong>the</strong> vouchers of poor student. <strong>The</strong> Jencks scheme would not allow<br />
extra billing or topping up at all, so that schools with a higher proportion of poor students<br />
would have better per-student funding.<br />
162 This is <strong>the</strong> “duplicity” that Witte points to in his criticism of <strong>the</strong> politics behind <strong>the</strong><br />
Milwaukee school voucher programme. It was introduced as a targeted means of helping<br />
poor inner city children, but has developed into a broad-based programme that may help<br />
middle-income families to <strong>the</strong> detriment of poor families. See Witte, supra note 2, p. 192.<br />
163 Ibid., p. 74.<br />
164 A no-extra-billing constraint would have to be made credible by mechanisms to guard<br />
against disguised extra billing via mandated or “expected” charitable contributions.<br />
165 Sherry Glied, Chronic Condition: Why Health Care Re<strong>for</strong>m Fails (Cambridge, MA:<br />
Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 220.<br />
166 For a discussion of standardized testing see Janice Stein, <strong>The</strong> Cult of Efficiency—<strong>The</strong><br />
Massey Lecture Series (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2001), Chapter 4, in particular pp.<br />
154–68. However, <strong>the</strong>re is some evidence that standardized testing in Canada tests to <strong>the</strong><br />
curriculum more effectively than is often <strong>the</strong> case in American schools. Standardized testing,<br />
<strong>the</strong>n, may be appropriate where tests designs facilitate ra<strong>the</strong>r than complicate <strong>the</strong><br />
development of human capital. See Panel on <strong>the</strong> Role of Government, “Voice and choice in<br />
education,” Staff Report: Creating a Human Capital Society <strong>for</strong> Ontario (Panel on <strong>the</strong> Role<br />
of Government, 2004), available at: http://www.lawlib.utoronto.ca/investing/staff/staffch2.pdf.;<br />
and Sweetman, supra note 69.<br />
167 J.Douglas Willms and Frank H.Echols, “<strong>The</strong> Scottish experience of parental school choice,”<br />
in Edith Rasell and Richard Rothstein (eds) School Choice: Examining <strong>the</strong> Evidence<br />
(Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1993), p. 49. <strong>The</strong> authors found that parents<br />
who exercised choice were “more highly educated and had more prestigious occupations<br />
than those who sent <strong>the</strong>ir children to <strong>the</strong> designated school.”<br />
168 For a definition of “credence” goods, see Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to <strong>the</strong><br />
Law of Evidence (1999), p. 51. Stan<strong>for</strong>d Law Review, 1477, p. 1489.<br />
169 It may be possible to get around this credibility problem of <strong>for</strong>-profit suppliers<br />
misrepresenting <strong>the</strong> quality of <strong>the</strong>ir service in two different ways. <strong>The</strong> first would be by<br />
having an independent organization—perhaps most credibly government—engaged in<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation ga<strong>the</strong>ring, analysing and dissemination processes. To <strong>the</strong> extent that education is<br />
a pure “credence” good in <strong>the</strong> aggregate, however, this ef<strong>for</strong>t may be frustrated. <strong>The</strong> second<br />
way might emerge spontaneously—parents might monitor acceptance rates into key<br />
universities, <strong>the</strong>reby learning much about <strong>the</strong> experts’ view of particular schools or<br />
programmes.