Rethinking the Welfare State: The prospects for ... - e-Library

Notes 230
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Bolen, E., “A poor measure of the wrong thing: the food stamp program’s quality control
system discourages participation by working families,” Hastings Law Journal, 53
(November, 2001), pp. 213–41.
27 For a comprehensive historical account, see Maurice MacDonald, Food, Stamps, and Income
Maintenance (New York: Academic Press, 1977).
28 The term paternalism often carries negative connotations (i.e. restricting autonomy and
choice of the beneficiary). However, if we interpret efficiency in its broadest sense, looking
at both those subsidized and those who are subsidizers, then paternalism may actually move
towards efficiency. Paternalistic actions can be characterized as efforts “to target specific
needs and adopt the most efficient method of achieving an equity goal.” See C.Eugene
Steuerle, “Common issues for voucher programs,” in Steurle et al. (supra note 5, pp. 3–39)
for such an argument.
29 USDA, supra note 21.
30 Simple cost-benefit analysis would dictate that the government adopt the policy which
minimizes costs. For example, if the cost to decrease fraud is more than the loss from fraud,
the economically prudent solution is to ignore the practice.
31 Critics of welfare payments invariably use such extreme illustrations in order to draw
attention to welfare abuse.
32 Robert Moffitt, “Incentive effects of the US welfare system: a review,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 30(1) (March, 1992), p. 14.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 This is of course assuming there are no illicit activities such as selling stamps for other goods
or cash.
36 Although an argument can be made that the consumption of food does not necessarily mean
the consumption of healthy food. The consumer is free to consume non-nutritious items.
37 Breunig, R., Dasgupta, I., Gundersen, C. and Pattanaik, P., Explaining the Food Stamp Cash-
Out Puzzle (April, 2001), p. 1, available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/. Document ID
‘fanrr12’.
38 For a representative characterization of this model, see especially Southworth, H., “The
economics of public measures to subsidize food,” Journal of Farm Economics, 68(1) (1945),
pp. 37–43.
39 For complete discussion on the extent to which vouchers are cash-equivalent see David
F.Bradford and Daniel Shaviro, “The economics of vouchers,” in C.Eugene Steuerle, Van
Doorn Ooms, George Peterson and Robert D.Reischauer (eds) Vouchers and the Provision of
Public Services (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, CED, Urban Institute Press,
2000), pp. 53–54.
40 Kuhn, supra note 2, p. 193.
41 Ibid., p. 194.
42 Breunig et al., supra note 37.
43 World Bank Policy Research Report, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 62.
44 Fraker, T., The Effects of Food Stamps on Food Consumption: A Review of the Literature,
USDA Food and Nutrition Service, available at: http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/.
45 Ibid.
46 Bishop, J.A., Formby, J.P. and Zeager, L.A., “The effect of food stamp cashout on
undernutrition,” Economics Letters, 67 (2000), p. 84.
47 Breunig et al., supra note 37, p. iii.
48 Ibid., p. 4.