Download PDF - Goodmans

as writs of seizure, were necessary to bring those assets into the liquidation
proceeding. The court rejected the claim that the liquidator was thereby
regulating non‐insurer corporations, finding the order was simply in
furtherance of the liquidator's duty to marshal the assets that are properly
included in the liquidation. The court squarely held that the insurance code
which authorizes the issuance of an injunction restraining, inter alia, "all other
persons from transacting any insurance business or disposing of its property,"
is intentionally broad to ensure that the jurisdiction of the liquidation court
extends to persons or entities such as defendants, who may have access,
control, or possession of the insurer's assets. Finally, the court held that it was
not required to stay the civil action pending the outcome of the criminal
proceedings filed against various individuals, because to do so would prejudice
the liquidator's civil remedy against those persons.
State v. Green, 94 1138 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So.2d 610. The
Commissioner of Insurance sought the declaration that a risk retention
group and its affiliated entities were a single business enterprise. The
insolvent risk retention group and its affiliated entities were declared to be a
single business entity, subject to receivership by the Commissioner. The
court further concluded that the Commissioner is entitled to injunctive relief
in the liquidation proceeding enjoining the affiliated entities from disposing
of property, preventing interference, or preventing waste. The court stated
that it is not necessary for the commissioner to show irreparable injury in
order to obtain injunctive relief against the affiliated entities, because the
remedy of an injunction is specifically provided for by La.R.S. 22:734.
Missouri Leggett v. General Indemnity Exchange, 363 Mo. 273, 250 S.W. 2d 710 (1952).
The Missouri insurance commissioner was authorized to seek dissolution of a
reciprocal insurance exchange if the corporation ceased to transact the
business of insurance for one year irrespective of the existence or
nonexistence of claims or creditors.
Youree v. Hometown Mutual Ins. Co., 180 Mo. 153, 79 S.W. 175 (1904). In
upholding the appointment of a receiver for an insurance company, the court
noted that although the former officers had sold the company to others and
empowered them to act as officers, they had been ousted on the ground that
they were never eligible to act as directors and officers, such that the company
then became insolvent. Yet the corporate entity, nevertheless, still existed for
purposes of the litigation by creditors of the insurer.
Nebraska State ex rel. Smrha v. Cosmopolitan Old Line Life Ins. Co., 287 N.W. 654, 136
Neb. 833, vacated, 137 Neb. 742, 291 N.W. 72 (1939). The Nebraska Supreme
Court vacated an earlier opinion and held that a benefit thrift certificate
containing both savings features and renewable term insurance for ten years
in an amount always exceeding the amount of premiums paid; application
attached to the certificate giving personal data concerning applicant and
beneficiary designation, providing that the certificate should not take effect
until the first payment would be received during good health of the applicant;
and providing for cash and loan values and other insurance features, was an
insurance contract, notwithstanding the absence of a required medical
examination, a change in premium rate with age and other features.
New Mexico
In re Rehabilitation of Western Investors Life Ins. Co., 100 N.M. 370, 671 P.2d
31 (1983). The provisions of the Life Insurance Guaranty Act establishing a
Life Insurance Guaranty Association to ensure that policyholders of an
insolvent or financially disabled company receive their policy benefits did not