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a third party, mutual debts, or debt from each party to the other that arise at<br />

the same time, between an insurance company and another person prior to the<br />

insurance company’s liquidation must be set‐off under 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/206.<br />

Indiana Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Indiana Department of Insurance, 274 Ind. 181, 409<br />

N.E. 2d 1092 (1980). The plaintiff insurer was reinsured by an insolvent Indiana<br />

company. The solvent insurer alleged that it had a preferred status over<br />

general creditors under the priority of distribution statute of the Indiana<br />

insurance code. The Indiana statute recognized as a class 3 priority those<br />

claims of policyholders and insureds, and class 4 was limited to general<br />

creditors. The insurer argued that it should fit between the class 3 and class 4<br />

priorities. That is, after all policyholders' claims were paid, it would be paid<br />

next with general creditors' claims being paid thereafter (pro rata). The<br />

Indiana Supreme Court rejected this position. The enactment of a statutory<br />

priority system eliminated the old rule that policyholders, insureds, re‐insureds,<br />

and general creditors, were all accorded the same priority of distribution. In<br />

examining the new Indiana priority provision, the Indiana Supreme Court<br />

found it was clearly the intention of the legislature to protect the ordinary<br />

insurance consumer. The failure to include reinsureds in the class 3 listing<br />

showed the legislature's intent to exclude reinsurance from class 3.<br />

Iowa<br />

Maryland<br />

State ex rel. Hager v. Iowa National Mutual Ins. Co., 430 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa<br />

1988). Several officers of an insolvent mutual insurance company in liquidation<br />

filed claims seeking recovery of their deferred compensation benefits as Class<br />

3 claims under the liquidation provisions of the Iowa Code which are patterned<br />

after the NAIC Model Act. In denying the claims, the Supreme Court of Iowa<br />

found that the third‐priority status "is aimed at the insolvent insurance<br />

company's obligation to its insureds and not to employee claims." 430 N.W.2d<br />

at 422. The Court also found that the officers of the Company were prohibited<br />

from invoking a second‐priority (claims of employees) status. The Court<br />

concluded that the officers' deferred compensation benefits were Class 4,<br />

general creditor claims.<br />

Md. Ins. Guar. Assn. v. Muhl, 66 Md. App. 359, 504 A.2d 637 (1986). State<br />

guaranty fund was not barred from making reimbursement claims against the<br />

insolvent insurer after the date specified in a court order as "the last date" for<br />

filing claims. Thus, the guaranty fund was entitled to retain its statutory<br />

preferred creditor status with regard to the assets of the insolvent insurer.<br />

Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 318 Mass. 238, 61<br />

N.E.2d 137 (1945). The court held that when the receiver paid in full other<br />

claims filed but not disputed up until the date of the liquidation order, disputed<br />

claims filed before the order which were ultimately reduced to judgment were<br />

entitled to payment in full insofar as they were the same type of claims which<br />

the receiver had been paying in full. The court also held that a disabled<br />

policyholder has no priority over a nondisabled policyholder or over an<br />

ordinary creditor.<br />

In re: The Liquidation of American Mut’l Liab. Ins. Co., 434 Mass. 272 (2001). In<br />

connection with the approval of a liquidation plan, the Court held that a statute<br />

giving preference to workers compensation claims over other policyholder<br />

claims, which was enacted after the entry of the liquidation order, did not<br />

violate other policyholders’ due process rights, but was simply the priority<br />

scheme chosen by the Legislature.<br />

Michigan<br />

Fletcher v. State Treasurer, 16 Mich. App. 87, 167 N.W.2d 594 (1969). Since<br />

trust deposit of securities made by a domestic casualty insurer was not made<br />

for benefit of limited class of persons, and was general asset for benefit of all

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