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Whitney M. Young, Jr. Health Ctr. v. New York State Dep't of Ins. Liquidation
Bureau, 155 A.D.2d 742 (3d Dep't 1989). Plaintiff Health Center had been sued
by a former patient and submitted a claim to its malpractice insurance carrier,
Integrity Insurance Company. Integrity disclaimed coverage on any acts of
malpractice which occurred prior to the date on which Integrity's coverage of
the Health Center began. When Integrity was placed in ancillary receivership in
New York, the Ancillary Liquidator reiterated the disclaimer of coverage. The
Health Center commenced a declaratory judgment action against Integrity
seeking an order determining coverage. The Ancillary Liquidator moved to
dismiss the action and for referral to the ancillary receivership court. The New
York Supreme Court for Albany County denied the Liquidation Bureau's
motion. The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed, holding that the
Health Center's declaratory judgment action was stayed pursuant to the order
of the liquidation and that the matter should be referred to the ancillary
receivership court.
North Carolina North Carolina Reinsurance Facility v. North Carolina Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 67
N.C. App. 359, 313 S.E.2d 253 (1984). The court held that funds from a state
automobile residual market mechanism owing to the insolvent insurer are not
"assets" within the meaning of the Uniform Act, and thus are not recoverable
by the ancillary receivers, but instead may be used by Guaranty Association.
Any remainder after paying covered claims to be given to domiciliary receiver.
This is result of intent of Uniform Act to keep local creditors from obtaining
unfair preference over assets of the insolvent insurer.
Texas
Moody v. State, 539 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), writ ref. n.r.e., cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978). While the
court agreed that the Texas ancillary receiver should have sought court
approval to extend the limited moratorium placed on the payments of cash
values upon the insolvent insurer's policies, the court affirmed the lower
court's summary judgment for the ancillary receiver because appellant had no
standing to sue and no justifiable interest in the case. An ancillary receiver has
the same rights, duties and liabilities as a domiciliary receiver. Appellant was a
claimant against the insurer's assets, which were transferred to a receiver.
Ancillary Receiver ‐ Relation to Domiciliary Receiver
Florida
Bartholomew v. Glens Falls Ins. Group, 241 So.2d 698 (Fla. App. 1970), cert.
dismissed, 262 So.2d 680 (1972). The Arkansas insurance commissioner's
proceedings declaring insurer insolvent and appointing receiver were not
determinative of date of insolvency for purposes of Florida uninsured motorist
coverage, although the Florida commissioner had recognized the same date in
ancillary proceedings. Plaintiff could present proof that the date of actual
insolvency was earlier.
Hobbs v. Don Mealey Chevrolet, Inc., 642 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994). The trial court had jurisdiction to determine claims against a Missouri
insurer in rehabilitation, as opposed to liquidation, even in the absence of an
ancillary receivership. Under the wording of Florida’s insurer insolvency
code, Florida residents are relegated to the receivership court to file their
claims only if the insurer is in liquidation.
Georgia
Preferred Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 225 Ga. 160, 166 S.E.2d 340 (1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 826 (1969). Where the Michigan domiciliary receiver did not object to
the final report of the Georgia ancillary receiver until after the report was
approved by the court, the objections were too late and were overruled.