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Illinois law does not provide the Director with creditor status to assert<br />

creditors' claims. Finally, in this context, the alter ego cause of action is<br />

unnecessary, for the Director can bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim,<br />

which involves the same assertion of parent‐shareholder misbehavior.<br />

Cadillac Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3238 (N.D. Ill.<br />

Mar. 19, 1991). The case concerned the ownership of five Certificates of<br />

Deposits ("CDs") totaling $4 million. Four were held in the name of Cadillac<br />

Insurance Co. ("Cadillac"), and one was held in the name of United Fire<br />

Insurance Co. ("Fire"), a wholly owned subsidiary of United Diversified Corp.<br />

("Diversified"). The Illinois Director of Insurance ("Director") was the<br />

Conservator of Diversified, the Liquidator of Fire, and Ancillary Receiver of<br />

Cadillac in Illinois. The Director sought to intervene in the case because Fire<br />

and Diversified made separate claims to the CDs. Both Cadillac and the<br />

majority shareholder of Diversified, Towers Diversified Corp. ("Towers"),<br />

pointed out potential ethical dilemmas facing the Director due to his<br />

positions as Ancillary Receiver, Conservator, and Liquidator, and given the<br />

allegedly divergent interests of Fire and Diversified. Towers sought to<br />

intervene as well, and sought to have the Director removed from the suit.<br />

Cadillac moved for summary judgment declaring it the owner of four CDs<br />

totaling $3.5 million, which the Director disputed. The Director moved for<br />

summary judgment declaring Fire the owner of the one CD worth $500,000.<br />

Both Cadillac and the Director moved for summary judgment against<br />

Towers, asserting it lacked standing to pursue Diversified interests. The<br />

court declined all motions for summary judgment. The court held there was<br />

a factual dispute concerning the ownership of the CDs, and that there was a<br />

factual dispute over whether there was a conflict of interest for the Director.<br />

Cadillac Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17383 (N.D. Ill.<br />

Dec. 2, 1991). The court denied the Michigan Commission of Insurance's<br />

motion for a protective order seeking to bar discovery of documents held by<br />

the Michigan Commissioner. In support of its motion, the Michigan<br />

Commissioner cited a Michigan statute protecting examination reports held<br />

by the Insurance Department from public inspection. The court, citing<br />

Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), held that production of<br />

documents in civil litigation did not constitute "public inspection," and thus<br />

the statute did not preclude discovery of the documents. Although the<br />

Michigan Commissioner also argued that it should not have to produce<br />

documents as if it were an original party to the dispute, the court rejected<br />

this effort to distinguish between identities of the insolvent insurance<br />

company and the Commissioner. The court held that because the<br />

Commissioner was the Liquidator for the insolvent insurer Cadillac, the<br />

Commissioner stood in the shoes of Cadillac and could not assert that<br />

Cadillac still maintained some separate identity. The Michigan Commissioner<br />

also sought to limit the questioning of witnesses at depositions. The court<br />

denied that motion, as the Michigan statute did not exempt witnesses from<br />

giving relevant testimony on matters of which they had knowledge, and<br />

because parties should not be precluded from inquiring into areas that may<br />

lead to the discovery of permissible evidence.<br />

Evans v. Illinois Surety Co., 220 Ill. App. 199 (Ill. App. 1920). affirmed, 298 Ill. 101,<br />

131 N.E. 262 (1921). The receiver could not terminate the contracts of the<br />

insolvent company as of the date of appointment, without the consent or<br />

acquiescence of the other party to the contract. The receiver's mere<br />

appointment does not terminate the contracts of the insolvent insurer nor

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