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easoning that: 1) its earlier finding did not involve a controlling question of
law; 2) there was no substantial ground for differing opinions about its earlier
finding; and 3) the defendants failed to show how an immediate appeal could
materially advance the termination of the litigation.
Tennessee Flowers v. Tennessee Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). The court had authority to enter a civil contempt
sanction against members of a compensation self‐insured group trust who
failed to make court‐ordered payments to the trust as requested by the
liquidator.
Texas Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, 839 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1992), reversing 811
S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.‐‐San Antonio 1991). Receiver of insolvent Vermont
insurer sued insurance agents pursuant to correspondent's agreement for
payment of earned premiums. Defendants filed compulsory counterclaims,
which resulted in a jury award for defendants on the counterclaim. Receiver
claimed the Vermont liquidation order, which included injunctions against
maintaining counterclaims or other actions against the receiver in any court
other than the Vermont liquidation court, should have been enforced in the
Texas court under principles of full faith and credit and/or comity. Reversing a
contrary appellate court judgment, the Texas Supreme Court agreed. The
court found the liquidation order sufficiently final to be entitled to full faith and
credit. The fact that the receivership court retained jurisdiction to discharge
the receiver and enter further orders with respect to assets of the estate did
not mandate a finding that the liquidation order was an interlocutory judgment
which was therefore not entitled to full faith and credit.
Further, the fact that a receiver is entitled to prosecute claims of the insolvent
estate in foreign jurisdictions does not also require the receiver to be subjected
to prosecution of claims against him in that foreign jurisdiction. The Texas
compulsory counterclaim statute did not require a contrary result; the
counterclaim requirement is a procedural rule which fosters judicial economy
by foreclosing piecemeal litigation. The order of the liquidation court which
requires all claims against the receiver to be brought in Vermont (or to be
heard in Texas by a Special Master appointed by the liquidator) also operated
to further judicial economy by ensuring that all claims against the insolvent
estate are prosecuted in one forum, enabling the receivership court to ensure
that all claimants are treated uniformly. The claims were ordered dismissed
without prejudice to prosecute them in Vermont.
Robbins v. Reliance Ins. Co., 102 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App. 2001). The court of
appeals refused to honor an anti‐suit injunction issued by a state court in
Pennsylvania. Reliance Insurance Company (“Reliance”) was placed under an
order of receivership by a Pennsylvania court, and the court issued an order
staying litigation in this cause pending Reliance’s rehabilitation. In analyzing
whether to honor the Pennsylvania court’s order and stay the appeal, the court
of appeals recognized two possible theories upon which it could enforce the
order. First, the court examined whether the Pennsylvania court properly had
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the immediate suit so as to
entitle its order to full faith and credit. Next, the court turned to whether the
Pennsylvania order substantially complied with relevant Texas Insurance Code
provisions relating to stays of pending suits against insurers placed under an
order of rehabilitation. Finding that the Pennsylvania court had neither
jurisdiction over the claims in its court nor had it complied with Texas law
governing the stay of suits against insurers placed under an order of