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moving party for an order to set aside conservatorship, but ruled that the error
was not prejudicial.
Illinois People v. Acme Plate Glass Mutual Ins. Co., 292 Ill. App. 275, 10 N.E.2d 988
(1935). The court, noting that although the application can be made to the
court either by the insurance commissioner or the company to find that the
causes for an order that a receiver be appointed has been removed and that
the company can properly resume possession of its property and the conduct
of its business, held that because the purpose of the liquidation law is also the
protection of the public against a willful default or misconduct of the company,
it was not required to permit resumption of insurance business. Liquidation
had been ordered pursuant to findings of insolvency, misrepresentations and
mismanagement.
Massachusetts
In re: Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 434 Mass. 51 (2001). Where a consumer
advocacy group acted as amicus curiae in a receivership proceeding, the Court
ruled that the group lacked standing to appeal the order terminating the
proceeding.
New York Matter of Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 149 Misc. 18, 266 N.Y.S. 603 (1933).
The court concluded that on no conceivable theory is it possible to justify
terminating rehabilitation while there exist grounds for rehabilitation. The
court recognized that a substantial reduction in the company's liabilities at a
time when advancing prices had enhanced the value of its assets, would
transform insolvency into a considerable net worth.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v. Keystone Mutual Casualty Co., 61 Dauph. 131
(1950). Once an insurance company has been dissolved, a court does not have
equitable powers to authorize its rehabilitation. Nor does any statute
authorize reestablishing its corporate entity.
Reopening Liquidation
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Croley v. Union Indemnity Co., 307 Mich. 177, 11 N.W. 2d 850 (1943). Where an
ancillary for a foreign insurance company was appointed by a receiver state
court and had transmitted to the domiciliary receivers all the assets of the
ancillary receivership, including an allowed claim against an insolvent bank, and
the domiciliary receivership had been closed, and there was no suit pending in
the state courts for or against the insurance company, the higher state court
had no jurisdiction to reappoint the ancillary receiver upon petition for
instructions concerning a check payable to the receiver for dividends on the
claim against the insolvent bank.
Commonwealth v. Bankers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Lancaster, Pa., 45 D.& C.2d
558 (1968). When the liquidator of a domestic mutual fire and casualty
company uses a 500 per cent loading factor, exceptions to it will be dismissed
where collection is sought after the company has been dissolved nearly 11
years and where it appears that the liquidator computed the factor with care
and precision and that the decision regarding the amount of loading was
proper and reasonable. The liquidator is not bound by a policy provision
limiting the time for making an assessment or by a regulatory time limit.