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Suit was transferred to the court of proper venue, and the transfer was upheld
on appeal. Whitson v. Harris, 682 S.W.423 (Tex. App.‐‐Amarillo 1984, no writ).
Receiver then asserted that the statute in question was jurisdictional and that
the transferor court therefore lacked jurisdiction to transfer the suit. The court
held: (1) the provision of the insurance code in question is a mandatory venue
statute; (2) the timely filing of suit, even in a court of improper venue, tolled
the three month limitations period; (3) upon transfer, the action stood as if it
had originally been filed in the proper court; and (4) the action was therefore
timely, and the transferee court had jurisdiction to decide the case.
Utah Wells, Ins. Com’r v. Guardian Cas. & Guar. Co., 60 Utah 353, 208 P. 497 (1922).
A court under whose supervision a receiver of an insolvent insurance
company operates has the discretionary power to fix the time within which
claims shall be filed and to fix a reasonable time within which the filed claims
shall be fixed and liquidated. The court is not bound to give preference to
those whose claims were filed, ascertained, and liquidated at and prior to
the date of appointment of a receiver.
Virginia
Andrews v. Cahoon, 196 Va. 790, 86 S.E.2d 173 (1955). A Virginia resident with a
claim against an insolvent New York insurer could proceed to enforce a lien
against the insurer's statutory deposit in Virginia, although the claimant had
made no attempt to prove the claim in the New York liquidation proceeding.
The statutory deposit provisions of the insurance code provide an alternative
mode of recovery for Virginia residents. The insured's failure to forward notice
of the suit pending against the insured to the insurer, in compliance with the
terms of the policy, was excused where the actions of the receiver showed
that such compliance would have been useless.
Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Mounts, 24 Va. App. 550, 484 S.E.2d 140
(1997). The decision in this case was upheld by the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Mounts, 255 Va. 254, 497 S.E.2d 464 (1998).
The Court of Appeals also held, and it was not addressed by the Supreme
Court, that a tentative diagnosis that an employee may have
pneumoconiosis will not trigger the running of the statute of limitations and
the employer, whose employment the employee was in when last injuriously
exposed to the hazards of the disease, and the employer’s insurance carrier
shall alone be liable. The Court further held that the Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association had no responsibilities for the claim since
the claim was made after the bar date for “covered claims” under the
Guaranty Association Statute.
West Virginia West Virginia v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 195 W.Va. 537, 466 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Logan Medical Foundation filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia after it was classified as a Class VI late‐filed claim,
for which no distribution was expected, due to untimely filing. Strict
compliance with all filing requirements is required in insurance insolvency
cases. W.Va. Code § 33‐24‐25.
The court held where a proof of claim complies with the statutory
requirements of W.Va. Code § 33‐24‐25 (1992), but is filed after the claims bar
date provided for by statute has elapsed, the proof of claim is properly
classified as a Class VI late‐filed claim as directed by the statute. The court
held the appellant’s proof of claim was not timely filed and failed to comply
with the relevant statutory provisions.
Wisconsin In the Matter of the Liquidation of Wisconsin Surety Corp., 112 Wis.2d 396, 332
N.W.2d 860 (1983). In an appeal from the denial of a claim under a surety