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ehalf of an insolvent insurance company as opposed to making a demand for
the undisputed assets of the insolvent insurance company. 2008 WL 3259045 at
4.
Fla. Ins. Guarantee Assoc., Inc. v. Soto, 979 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Courts
are to liberally construe the FIGA Act “to avoid excessive delay in payment and
to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of
an insurer.” 979 So. 2d at 966 (citing § 631.51(1), Fla. Stat. (2001)).
Ocean Bank v. Fla. Dep't. Fin. Serv., 902 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (per
curiam), rev. dismissed, 944 So. 2d 251 (2006). Issue consent orders appointing
receiver; issue orders commencing automatic stays, authorizing receiver to
liquidate assets, and allowing or prohibiting receiver's ability to accept service of
process.
Super Transport, Inc. v. Florida Dep't. of Ins., 799 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
Trial court's equitable decision in receivership matter involving insolvent
workers' compensation fund to assess fund members even if fraud in
inducement was proven was supported by long‐established equitable principle
recognizing that, if two innocent parties are injured by fraud of third party, one
who made loss possible must bear legal responsibility. 799 So. 2d at 289.
The court is required to determine the reasonableness of the Receiver's
attorney fee agreement required by section 631.141(6), and is not required to
adopt the lodestar approach applied in statutory fee‐shifting cases pursuant to
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985) and
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990). 799 So. 2d at
290.
Georgia
Royal Indem. Co. et al. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool, 284 Ga. App. 787 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied (Sep. 10, 2007). Trial court in declaratory judgment
action by Insurers Insolvency Pool did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
order plant owner's insurer to pay workers' compensation to temporary
employee following insolvency of direct employer's insurer; a claim against the
plant owner's insurer remained unresolved. 284 Ga. App. 789.
Illinois Miller v. Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 194, 19 N.E.2d 822
(1939). Although the power to appoint a receiver is lodged by statute in the
insurance commissioner, the powers of a court in insurance liquidation
proceedings are not strictly limited to those expressly given by statute: Rather,
such power should be sufficiently broad to permit the effective liquidation of
the company in the proceeding brought before the court. The court noted
that during the course of liquidation, the receiver repeatedly encounters
doubtful questions and, it would be absurd to require the receiver to file
independent proceedings each time the aid and instructions of the court was
needed.
People ex rel. Day v. Progress Ins. Assn., 8 Ill. App. 2d 75, 130 N.E.2d 526 (1956).
The court held that its jurisdiction in insurance liquidation proceedings are not
strictly limited to those expressly given by statute, but should be sufficiently
broad to permit the effective liquidation of the insurance company. The
interwoven affairs of the insolvent insurer and its attorney‐in‐fact, and the
alleged indebtedness of the attorney‐in‐fact to the insurer made impossible an
effective liquidation of the insurer without a receivership for the
attorney‐in‐fact, and such a receivership would have been proper as part of the
relief granted under the original liquidation petition.