01.01.2014 Views

Download PDF - Goodmans

Download PDF - Goodmans

Download PDF - Goodmans

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

liquidator" once liquidation is ordered. Further, the Court held that the<br />

intervenors attempted to shortcut the liquidation process, contrary to the<br />

liquidation act, and therefore the Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal<br />

of the petitions for return of the funds.<br />

New York<br />

North Carolina<br />

Ohio<br />

Oklahoma<br />

Pennsylvania<br />

De Carlo v. Brye, 42 Misc.2d 667, 248 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1964). Where all of the<br />

parties in the actions conceded that the fund, which was the subject matter of<br />

the litigation, was one subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner<br />

and that the fund should be liquidated, the commissioner's application for<br />

permission to intervene would be granted and the commissioner would be<br />

directed to prepare and enter an order of liquidation, and then all of the<br />

actions would be dismissed.<br />

State of North Carolina v. Interstate Casualty Insurance Co., et al., 417 S.E.2d<br />

296 (N.C. App. 1992). An insurance company guaranteed warranty contracts of<br />

a corporation. The State later advised the corporation and the insurance<br />

company that their acts and practices related to the contracts constituted an<br />

unfair and deceptive trade practice. Settlement agreements were entered into<br />

between contract purchasers, the corporation and the insurance company.<br />

Upon failure of the corporation to comply with the terms of the settlement<br />

agreements, a class action was filed against it. Thereafter, the State instituted<br />

a liquidation proceeding against the insurance company. The plaintiffs in the<br />

class action filed a class proof of claim and a Motion to Intervene in the<br />

liquidation proceeding. The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to<br />

intervene as of right as their interests were protected by the filing of the proof<br />

of claim and would be adequately represented by the liquidator.<br />

Jump v. Manchester Ins. and Indem. Co., Nos. 91AP‐492, 91AP‐510, 1991 Ohio<br />

App. LEXIS 5382 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1991). The court held that the trial court<br />

abused its discretion in denying two insureds' motions to intervene into the<br />

liquidation proceedings of an insolvent insurer. At a status hearing, held prior<br />

to the filing of the motions to intervene and attended by all the relevant<br />

parties, the trial court agreed to allow the two insureds to intervene and later<br />

issued an order stating the same.<br />

Okla. ex rel. Crawford v. Am. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 971 (Okla.<br />

Civ. App. 2001). The court held general creditors of an insolvent insurance<br />

company did not have standing to intervene in the liquidation proceeding<br />

because general creditors do not have a direct interest in any particular asset of<br />

the receivership estate. The court explained that OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2024 (1991)<br />

did not confer an unconditional right to intervene, and the Oklahoma Uniform<br />

Insurers Liquidation Act (“OUILA”) was the controlling statute.<br />

Chow v. Rosen, 571 Pa. 369, 812 A.2d 587 (Pa. 2002). Plaintiff sued several<br />

doctors for medical malpractice. The appellant paid medical benefits on behalf<br />

of the plaintiff for the treatment of his injuries, thereby giving it a subrogation<br />

interest on any recoveries. The defendant’s primary insurer was placed in<br />

liquidation and the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty<br />

Association (“PPCIGA”) assumed the obligation of paying the covered claims of<br />

the defendant. The plaintiff and defendant entered into a settlement<br />

agreement that specifically contemplated an offset against settlement<br />

proceeds of medical benefits paid by the appellant, a subrogee health insurance<br />

provider. The court held that the appellant was not entitled to intervene to<br />

assert its subrogation interest in the medical malpractice action. It reasoned<br />

that ordinarily the appellant would have a right to intervene, but the non‐

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!