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involving an insolvent insurer. Moreover, the receiver agreed to submit to the<br />

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in the agreement with the bankruptcy<br />

examiner related to the disposition and sale of the subject receivership<br />

property. After denying the receiver’s challenge to jurisdiction on the basis of<br />

McCarran‐Ferguson, the court denied the receiver’s alternative request that the<br />

bankruptcy court abstain from hearing the bankruptcy examiner’s petition for<br />

adversarial proceeding. The court reasoned that the abstention was within the<br />

sound discretion of the lower court and would not be overturned on appeal.<br />

Van Riper v. Corr. Med. Servs., 44 Fed. Appx. 445 (10th Cir. 2002). Defendant<br />

physicians moved to abate an appeal of summary judgment ruling in their favor<br />

at the trial court level based on said defendants’ liability insurer being declared<br />

insolvent and entering liquidation. The defendants argued that the<br />

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania order staying all proceedings in which<br />

the insolvent liability insurer has a duty to defend was entitled to full faith and<br />

credit by the federal appellate court. The Tenth Circuit disagreed noting that<br />

the insurer was not a party to the appeal, and if it were, the state court was<br />

without power to enjoin an action in federal court. The appellate court<br />

explained that the proceeding at issue was not an in rem action implicating the<br />

jurisdiction of the receivership court, but rather was an in personam action with<br />

regard to the defendant insureds. The Tenth Circuit noted that the appellants<br />

did not ask the court to consider whether it should defer to the subject state<br />

liquidation statutes in light of the McCarran‐Ferguson Act.<br />

Arkansas<br />

Baldwin‐United Corp. v. Garner, 283 Ark. 385, 678 S.W.2d 754 (1984). The<br />

insurance commissioner, as receiver of three insolvent insurance companies<br />

owned by one corporation, proposed a rehabilitation plan which was approved<br />

by the court. The parent corporation appealed the plan's provisions that: (i)<br />

the rehabilitation court had exclusive jurisdiction over the assets of the<br />

companies, and (ii) the rehabilitation court would refuse to honor a judgment<br />

obtained in any other forum. In affirming the lower court's decision, the<br />

Supreme Court of Arkansas announced that nothing contained in the<br />

McCarran‐Ferguson Act or the Bankruptcy Act prohibits a state from<br />

determining the rights of an insurance company's creditors. Furthermore, the<br />

appellate court added, the lower court properly ordered that all claims to the<br />

companies' assets be adjudicated in the rehabilitation court.<br />

California Wagner v. Amwest Ins. Group, 285 B.R. 447 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002). The<br />

Nebraska liquidator brought an action for declaratory relief as to the court’s<br />

jurisdiction and rights to a tax refund under a tax allocation agreement between<br />

an insurance holding company and its subsidiary. Citing the McCarran‐Ferguson<br />

Act, a California bankruptcy court held it was reverse preempted from<br />

interpreting the agreement because interpretation would be directly related to<br />

“the business of insurance.”<br />

Colorado Phillips v. Lincoln Nat. Health & Cas. Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1991).<br />

The liquidation of an insolvent insurance company is not the "business of<br />

insurance" as that term is used in the McCarran‐Ferguson Act. An arbitration<br />

clause contained in a reinsurance contract is not barred by the McCarran<br />

Ferguson Act as an impairment to Colorado's regulation of the business of<br />

insurance.<br />

In re First Assured Warranty Corp., 383 B.R. 502. (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007). To<br />

determine whether an entity is the substantial equivalent of an insurance<br />

company, courts compare the powers conferred upon or withheld from the

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