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exhaust the pro rata shares of solvent insurers before LIGA would be obligated<br />

to assume responsibility for the pro rata share of the exposure attributed to the<br />

insolvent insurer of Southern Silica (“Reliance”). LIGA relied on LSA‐R.S. 22:1386<br />

stating, “Any person having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an<br />

insurance policy other than a policy of an insolvent insurer which is also a<br />

covered claim, shall be required first to exhaust his rights under such policy. . . .”<br />

The supreme court held that, under the exposure theory, the solvent insurers<br />

would only be liable for their pro rata shares of coverage for the years that they<br />

provided insurance to the tortfeasor. At the same time, LIGA would be<br />

responsible for the pro rata share of Southern Silica’s exposure for the years<br />

that the insolvent insurer (“Reliance”) provided coverage to Southern Silica.<br />

Maryland Maryland Insurance Guaranty Association v. Muhl, 671, September Term, 1985,<br />

slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. Appeals, February 10, 1986). The court held that<br />

retroactive effect should be given to the section of the liquidation statute<br />

which grants a priority to claims of Maryland's guaranty fund because to do so<br />

created no basic unfairness or manifest injustice and the remedial nature of the<br />

statute supported a finding of retroactivity.<br />

Oklahoma<br />

State ex rel. Crawford v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 1997 Okla. 10, 954 P.2d<br />

1235 (1998). A statute eliminating reinsurer’s right to offset obligation to pay<br />

claims against right to receive premiums where reinsurance agreement did<br />

not truly transfer risk could not be applied retroactively so as to deprive<br />

reinsurer of contractual right of offset under reinsurance agreement made<br />

before effective date of amendment with respect to policies bought before<br />

passage of amended statute. However, this ruling was subject to the<br />

requirements that the policy owners continued to pay premiums after<br />

effective date and the transactions giving rise to claims arose after passage.<br />

Welch v. Union Mut’l Life. Ins. Co. of Providence, 1989 Okla. 117, 776 P.2d 847<br />

(1989). An amendment to the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty<br />

Association Act exempting uninsured motorist coverage from exhaustion<br />

requirement for bringing claim against Guaranty Association did not apply to<br />

an accident that occurred before the amendment was passed.<br />

Rhode Island<br />

Langdeau v. Naragansett Ins. Co., 96 R.I. 276, 191 A.2d 28 (1963). The court held<br />

that the insurance liquidation provisions enacted after the decision in this case<br />

were procedural in nature and should be applied retroactively if doing so<br />

would not impair the obligations to the insurance company's policyholders.<br />

Transferring the contents of a liquidated special trust fund held by the General<br />

Treasurer to the receiver would not impair the vested rights of policyholders or<br />

beneficiaries since the receiver would take the funds subject to and be<br />

impressed with a trust.<br />

Texas Tapiador v. North American Lloyds of Texas, 778 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. ‐‐<br />

Houston [1st Dist.]1989). After appeal was filed, insurance carrier was declared<br />

insolvent. Appellants sought to add the receiver as a party on appeal, and<br />

receiver resisted claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over him until such<br />

time as an administrative claim had been filed and rejected. The court held<br />

that the receiver was properly added as a party on appeal, noting that the<br />

administrative claim provision of the insurance code applies to claims which<br />

arise after the insolvency and not to lawsuits which are pending at the time of<br />

insolvency. Similarly, the provision which allows the receiver a one year period<br />

after his appointment to appear in a lawsuit is applicable to suits begun at the<br />

trial level, not on appeal. A contrary holding would cause unreasonable delays<br />

in resolving suits which are pending prior to the appointment of the receiver.

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