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the insurance code. The trial court held that the civil statute venue provision
was mandatory and controlled the permissive venue provision in the insurance
code. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, noting that venue was proper in
Bexar County, subject however to a plea of abatement to show that the Bexar
County suits were fraudulent, brought only for venue purposes, not actually
seeking to recover or clear title to Bexar County land.
Langdeau v. Jones, 364 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). When the receiver of
insurer was named as co‐defendant in tort action which had been brought in
another county before the commencement of the delinquency proceeding in
Travis County, the court held that, under the insurance code, venue was
proper, as to the receiver only in Travis County. The civil statutes did not
control.
McFarling v. Cavender, 469 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). The insurance
code, which fixes venue of actions against insurance companies in
conservatorship is mandatory, not permissive.
Wheeler v. Metteauer, 282 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). Nothing in the
insurance code contradicts the civil statutes which place venue for actions
against a receiver of a corporation in the county of the principal office of the
corporation. The purpose behind the civil statute was to abolish the common
law rule that only the court appointing receiver had jurisdiction and venue.
Thus, the court appointing receiver did not have exclusive jurisdiction to
determine claims against the receiver.
Whitson v. Harris, 682 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). The venue provision of
Deceptive Trade Practices ‐ Consumer Protection Act of the Business and
Commerce Code must yield to the mandatory venue provision provided in the
liquidation provision of the insurance code, which provides that actions upon
claims rejected by the receiver must be brought in the court in which the
delinquency proceeding is pending.
Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.‐‐Austin 1990, writ denied). After
rejection of their claim in the receivership proceeding, claimants timely filed
suit, but in a county other than the one in which the receivership was pending.
Suit was transferred to the court of proper venue, and the transfer was upheld
on appeal. Whitson v. Harris, 682 S.W.423 (Tex. App.‐‐Amarillo 1984, no writ).
Receiver then asserted that the statute in question was jurisdictional and that
the transferor court therefore lacked jurisdiction to transfer the suit. The court
held: (1) the provision of the insurance code in question is a mandatory venue
statute; (2) the timely filing of suit, even in a court of improper venue, tolled
the three month limitations period; (3) upon transfer, the action stood as if it
had originally been filed in the proper court; and (4) the action was therefore
timely, and the transferee court had jurisdiction to decide the case.
West Virginia
Sims v. Homeseekers Fire Ins. Co., 117 W.Va. 84, 183 S.E. 869 (1936). The
insurance commissioner determined that an insurer was insolvent, and
instituted a suit to appoint a receiver for the company. The insurance code
provided that the insurance commissioner could file a bill in the Circuit Court of
Kanawah County (state capitol) for the purpose of dissolving the company.
The insurer insisted that this was a mandatory jurisdictional section, and that
the receivership was invalid because it had been filed in another county. The
court held that the insurance commissioner had the discretion to bring the suit
in a county other than the county of the state capitol.