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South Carolina
Texas
New South Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 258 S.C. 198, 187 S.E.2d 794 (1972). The court
held that, while the South Carolina insurance code authorized any circuit court
in any county of the state to hear an action for the purpose of rehabilitating an
insurance company, the Ridgeland County Court nevertheless had no subject
matter jurisdiction over such an action, since it had only the jurisdiction
expressly conferred by the South Carolina insurance code.
A. B. Lewis Co., Inc. v. Wheeler, 323 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), writ dism.
w.o.j. When the receiver of the insurer filed suit in Travis County, the
defendant pled privilege to be sued in the defendant's county of residence,
since he had no office or agent in Travis County. The court held that under the
liquidation provisions, venue was proper in Travis County because receiver
alleged that delinquency proceedings were pending in that county and that the
receiver had instituted the suit after the commencement of the delinquency
proceeding, and there was an intimate connection between the subject of the
suit and the receivership proceeding.
Atkins v. Wheeler, 307 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), writ dismissed w.o.j. In
an action by receiver of insurance company for premiums and commissions
due on contract, it was held that venue provisions in contract did not
supersede the venue provisions established by the legislature in the insurance
code, in which venue is fixed in the county where the delinquency proceedings
are pending for all actions against an insurer after delinquency proceedings are
instituted. Allegations by the receiver that delinquency proceedings are
pending, and that suit was filed subsequent to commencement of the
proceedings is sufficient to fix jurisdiction under the code.
Bennett v. Langdeau, 348 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), writ dismissed, 362
S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1962). When the receiver of insurer brought suit which
affected land located in Bexar County, the defendant argued that the Texas
Civil Statutes provided that venue was proper in county where land was
located, even though that conflicted with the insurance liquidation provisions,
which provided for venue in the county where the delinquency proceeding had
been commenced. The court held that the liquidation provision of the
insurance code controlled. On writ to the Supreme Court of Texas, this
decision was withdrawn for being correctly decided for the wrong reason.
That court held that the civil statute did not apply to an action to set aside a
lien upon land, and as a result, there was no conflict with the insurance code.
Bouknight v. Williamson, 314 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), writ dism. w.o.j.
In suit by receiver brought in Travis County, the agent pled to be sued in Harris
County, since the agent resided there and the contract provided that it was
fully performable there. The court held, that under the liquidation provision,
venue was proper in Travis County because delinquency proceedings were
pending there, and the suit was instituted by the receiver subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
Brodhead v. Dodgin, 824 S.W.2d 616 (Tex App.‐‐Austin 1991). Upon rejection of
their proof of claim by the receiver of Mission National, the insolvent excess
carrier, injured claimants sued the receiver in the liquidation proceeding. The
receiver argued for dismissal, claiming the action was an intervention in the
liquidation proceeding not permitted by the insurance code. The court
severed the action from the liquidation proceeding, and assigned it a separate
suit number. The court held that the provision of the insurance code which
required the filing of a separate suit in the same court in which the liquidation