01.01.2014 Views

Download PDF - Goodmans

Download PDF - Goodmans

Download PDF - Goodmans

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Commonwealth tort claims against the Company's employee health insurer in<br />

liquidation (Keystone Medical Services and its successor, Monsour Medical<br />

Foundation). The Third Circuit vacated so much of the District Court's order<br />

dismissing plaintiff's claims that were broader than, or different from, those<br />

asserted by the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Insurance in the<br />

Commonwealth court action and declared that the Federal action be stayed<br />

during the pendency of the liquidation proceedings. The retention of<br />

jurisdiction by the District Court was hoped to avoid any applicable statute of<br />

limitations defense.<br />

University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick & Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3rd Cir. 1991). The<br />

Third Circuit vacated an Order dismissing the policy holders' Amended<br />

Complaint and remanded to the Pennsylvania District Court an action brought<br />

against the independent auditor (Peat Marwick) of insolvent Mutual Fire,<br />

Marine and Inland Insurance Company, holding that Burford and Colorado<br />

River abstention doctrines did not apply to bar the Federal action because (1) it<br />

did not appear that the Commonwealth court would have jurisdiction over the<br />

policyholder(s)' claims in the insolvency estate but rather a third party (Peat<br />

Marwick); (2) the policyholder(s)' claims were distinct from those brought by<br />

the Commissioner of Insurance on behalf of the insolvent insurer in the<br />

Commonwealth court action; and (3) the action was at law, not in equity, and<br />

sought only money damages. 6 Hence, both the District Court and<br />

Commonwealth Court actions were allowed to proceed simultaneously.<br />

Fifth Circuit<br />

Barnhardt Marine Ins., Inc. v. New England International Surety of America,<br />

Inc., 961 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1992). Insurance broker brought action as subrogee<br />

against insolvent insurer and its president and chairman of the board to<br />

recover unearned premiums paid after insolvency. Citing the McCarran‐<br />

Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, the court affirmed an administrative stay<br />

pending resolution of all proceedings in the state liquidation court on the<br />

grounds of Burford abstention. Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098<br />

(1943). The action against the president and chairman of the board individually<br />

for mismanagement and under capitalization was also properly stayed,<br />

because the derivative claim involved the same assets which the Commissioner<br />

was required to collect and distribute in the liquidation proceeding. Pursuit of<br />

those claims in federal court would "usurp" Louisiana's control over the<br />

liquidation proceeding, permit plaintiff to obtain an unfair advantage over<br />

other claimants, and "encroach" into the Commissioner's exclusive power as<br />

liquidator.<br />

Brown v. Link Belt Division of FMC Corp., 666 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1982). The court<br />

affirmed a stay of all claims against an insolvent insurer, that was placed in<br />

liquidation during the pendency of the actions.<br />

Eighth Circuit<br />

Beasley v. Keiper, 2002 WL 1078388 (8th Cir. 2002). The Eighth Circuit denied<br />

defendant’s request to stay a pending appeal when defendants’ insurer, PHICO<br />

Insurance Company, became subject to a liquidation order, determining that all<br />

the work of defense counsel already had been done, the case was fully briefed<br />

and ready for decision without argument, there were no additional expenses<br />

chargeable to the insurance company, and further processing by the relevant<br />

state authorities of claims against the insurance company would in no way be<br />

impeded by the court’s affirming the decision in the case.<br />

6 On remand, the Pennsylvania District Court dismissed plaintiff's case based on a statute of<br />

limitations and lack of causation grounds. 1991 U.S. District LEXIS 13561 (9/25/91).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!