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an action to recover for the benefit of the receivership estate certain sums of
money allegedly owed the insolvent insurance company. Defendant
counterclaimed alleging primarily an illegal seizure of funds. The court held that
since plaintiff was named in his official capacity as the Superintendent of
Insurance in the counterclaim, the relief requested was against the state.
Consequently, the counterclaim involved a civil suit for money damages against
the state and the Court of Claims had original, exclusive jurisdiction. Dismissal of
the counterclaim was therefore proper pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Oklahoma
Oklahoma Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assoc. v. Class Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
963 P.2d 622 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998) cert. denied. The Oklahoma Guaranty
Association brought suit against general managing agent and insurer,
alleging that the insurer was liable for policies issued in the insolvent
insurer’s name under a fronting arrangement. The insurer argued that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the
insolvent foreign insurer’s state of domicile was not the only proper forum
for determining whether its relationship with second insurer was one of
reinsurance or whether second insurer was primary insurer liable directly on
workers’ compensation policies issued to insureds in another state.
State v. Liberty Investors Life Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 1390 (Okla. 1975). Guarantor of
insurance stocks seized by a receiver was subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the receivership court even though personal service was not made because
once the receivership court obtained possession of the stocks, the receivership
court is vested with the power over all controversies relating to those stocks.
Pennsylvania
Maleski v. Conning and Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14064 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Where
defendants brought an action against an insolvent insurer involving state law
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, bad faith breach of
contract, professional negligence, and civil conspiracy, the Commissioner of
Insurance sought to remove the action to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, claiming that abstention was appropriate to avoid interference
with the ongoing liquidation proceedings. Where the lawsuit directly involved
the assets of the insolvent estate of the insurer, and attack the liquidator's
authority to sell those assets, the Court held that abstention pursuant to
Burford was appropriate.
Texas Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, 839 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1992), reversing 811
S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.‐‐San Antonio 1991). Receiver of insolvent Vermont insurer
sued insurance agents pursuant to correspondent's agreement for payment of
earned premiums. Defendants filed compulsory counterclaims, which resulted
in a jury award for defendants on the counterclaim. Receiver claimed the
Vermont liquidation order, which included injunctions against maintaining
counterclaims or other actions against the receiver in any court other than the
Vermont liquidation court, should have been enforced in the Texas court under
principles of full faith and credit and/or comity. Reversing a contrary appellate
court judgment, the Texas Supreme Court agreed. The court found the
liquidation order sufficiently final to be entitled to full faith and credit. The fact
that the receivership court retained jurisdiction to discharge the receiver and
enter further orders with respect to assets of the estate did not mandate a
finding that the liquidation order was an interlocutory judgment which was
therefore not entitled to full faith and credit.
Further, the fact that a receiver is entitled to prosecute claims of the insolvent
estate in foreign jurisdictions does not also require the receiver to be subjected