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uniform law or that it was necessary to secure otherwise unavailable benefits
for New York, retaliation would not be a motive found in the statute. The
statute's purpose was to expand the areas for interstate comity.
Levin v. Nat’l Colonial Ins. Co., 806 N.E.2d 473 (N.Y. 2004). The lower state court
improperly exercised jurisdiction over a trust fund, which was a “special
deposit” under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (UILA). The lower court
was required to give full faith and credit to an order of the Kansas liquidation
court approving the classification and disposition of the trust remainder, which
was directed to be transferred to the insolvent insurer’s liquidator in Kansas.
The New York and Kansas statutes are similar, and Kansas is a reciprocal state
for UILA purposes.
Oregon
Ainsworth v. Cincotta, 79 Or. App. 574, 721 P.2d 455 (1986). The court held that
the Director of the Missouri Division of Insurance, as the domiciliary receiver,
was allowed to recover balances due from local agents in Oregon, because
Missouri was a "reciprocal state," a state which as adopted the Uniform
Insurers Liquidation Act.
Nasef v. U&J Investments, Inc., 91 Or. App. 344, 755 P.2d 126 (1988). Insurer
was the subject of insolvency proceedings in Indiana, its domiciliary state.
Indiana and Oregon have both enacted and consequently, are "reciprocal
states" under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. The court held that the
existence of the proceedings in Indiana barred the further prosecution of an
action in Oregon against the insurer on an insurance contract, even though the
Indiana court's orders foreclosing further proceedings may have been
temporary in nature.
South Carolina Smalls v. Weed, 293 S.C. 364, 360 S.E.2d 531 (1987) (following remand by 292
S.C. 408, 356 S.E.2d 843 (1987)). Despite the fact that South Carolina and
Tennessee are reciprocal states under South Carolina's version of the Uniform
Insurer's Liquidation Act, a South Carolina insured is not prohibited from
bringing an action in South Carolina to prove a claim against the rehabilitator of
a Tennessee insurance company since the statutory provisions prohibiting
actions against liquidators of insurance companies were determined not to be
applicable to actions against a rehabilitator. Therefore, South Carolina courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over an insured's action to prove a claim
against a domiciliary rehabilitator from Tennessee.
Texas Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, 839 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1992), reversing 811
S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.‐‐San Antonio 1991). Receiver of insolvent Vermont
insurer sued insurance agents pursuant to correspondent's agreement for
payment of earned premiums. Defendants filed compulsory counterclaims,
which resulted in a jury award for defendants on the counterclaim. Receiver
claimed the Vermont liquidation order, which included injunctions against
maintaining counterclaims or other actions against the receiver in any court
other than the Vermont liquidation court, should have been enforced in the
Texas court under principles of full faith and credit and/or comity. Reversing a
contrary appellate court judgment, the Texas Supreme Court agreed. The
court found the liquidation order sufficiently final to be entitled to full faith and
credit. The fact that the receivership court retained jurisdiction to discharge
the receiver and enter further orders with respect to assets of the estate did
not mandate a finding that the liquidation order was an interlocutory judgment
which was therefore not entitled to full faith and credit.
Further, the fact that a receiver is entitled to prosecute claims of the insolvent
estate in foreign jurisdictions does not also require the receiver to be subjected
to prosecution of claims against him in that foreign jurisdiction. The Texas
compulsory counterclaim statute did not require a contrary result; the