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of due process of law where interested persons, including claimant, received<br />

timely specific instructions from the court and receiver concerning when,<br />

where and how to file objections to disallowance of claim.<br />

Tennessee Sizemore v. United Physicians Ins. Risk Retention Group, 958 S.W.2d 348, 1997<br />

Tenn. App. LEXIS 372 (1997). Receiver of the liability carrier denied patient’s<br />

claim due to patient filing late, although the patient was not informed of the<br />

receiver’s deadline for claims. Court held that the patient’s right under<br />

Tennessee Code § 56‐9‐311 to file a claim in the receivership proceedings<br />

included the right to receive notice of the claim deadline. The liability insurer<br />

was in liquidation under a statute that specifically provided for notice to and<br />

claims of all persons reasonably expected to have claims against the insurer.<br />

Also, the receiver obtained correspondence and records that reasonably<br />

notified him of the patient’s claim. The patient obtained judgment in a separate<br />

action against the insured doctor; hence the patient’s right in the insured<br />

doctor’s liability coverage became an enforceable right.<br />

Texas<br />

Great American Investment Co. v. McFarling, 416 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.<br />

1967), writ ref. n.r.e. The plaintiffs filed claim with receiver which was rejected<br />

and the receivership proceedings was then closed. Plaintiffs sought to have<br />

the order closing the receivership set aside on the ground that their claims had<br />

not been properly rejected and the receivership should therefore not have<br />

been closed. The court held that the provision requiring the receiver to notify<br />

claimants of rejection allows the receiver's attorney to make such notice, and<br />

requires any action upon a rejected claim to be brought within three months of<br />

the rejection.<br />

Claims Against the Estate ‐ In General<br />

Phinney v. Langdeau, 337 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), writ ref. n.r.e. The<br />

District Director of Internal Revenue filed claims against three insolvent<br />

insurers, and the receiver rejected such claims. The District Director brought<br />

action on the rejected claims, but court held that such action was barred by the<br />

three month time limitation in the liquidation provisions in the insurance code.<br />

On appeal, it was held that: 1) receiver's written notice of rejection was not<br />

proper notice of rejection because it was not addressed to the district director,<br />

who had signed the proof of claim; 2) the court order authorizing the rejection<br />

of the claims did not constitute written notice of rejection; and 3) because of<br />

improper notice of rejection, the three month time limitation never began to<br />

run.<br />

Eighth Circuit<br />

Arizona<br />

Beale v. Connecticut Fire Ins. of Hartford, Conn., 120 F. 790 (8th Cir. 1903). The<br />

court rejected a claim by an assignee of an insolvent insurer against another<br />

solvent insurer because the assignee could not take title which would support<br />

a suit to recover assets claimed to have been wrongfully diverted by the<br />

insolvent insurer's directors and officers from the solvent insurer, which had<br />

assumed the business of the insolvent insurer, since such insurer had nothing<br />

to assign due to its supervision by the Missouri insurance commissioner due to<br />

insolvency.<br />

Academy Life Ins. Co. v. Odiorne, 797 P.2d 727, 165 Ariz. 188 (1990). The<br />

Arizona Court of Appeals held that: (1) a receivership claimant had standing to<br />

challenge another claimant's claim by raising defenses personal to the debtor,<br />

if the receiver had not raised them; (2) the four‐month proof of claim filing<br />

period did not constitute a statute of limitations, and does not revive a claim<br />

that is otherwise time barred; and (3) a claim arising in another state that is<br />

valid in that state may be asserted in an Arizona receivership even if the<br />

Arizona statute of limitations would bar that claim.

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