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ancillary receiver of the Missouri insurer. Both insurers then excepted to subject
matter jurisdiction and venue. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the
action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court noted that both
Louisiana and Missouri have adopted the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act and
that the Act's "statutory scheme for receiverships is comprehensive and
exclusive" [emphasis by court]. Accordingly, all persons asserting claims,
including the plaintiff state officials, were required to file in the parish court in
which the liquidations were pending, or, in the case of the Missouri insurer, in
the parish court in which the ancillary receiver had been appointed. The Court
rejected a claim that the objection was to venue and had therefore been
waived.
Missouri
Montana
State ex rel. Waddell v. Smith, 131 Mo. 176, 33 S.W. 11 (1985). The liquidator of an
insolvent Missouri insurer brought a writ of mandamus to stop the pursuit of an
appeal against the insurer. The court held that although the Missouri liquidator
may have been delinquent (6 months) in intervening in the appeals process, the
instant intervention foreclosed the appeal from going forward since the
appellate court no longer had jurisdiction since all actions were to be
transferred to the liquidation court.
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. (U.S. Branch) v. First Interstate Bank, 789 P.2d
1237, 242 Mont. 216 (1990). In 1985, First Interstate Bank ("FIB") issued a letter
of credit to Gerling Global to secure reinsurance receivables owed from Glacier
General Assurance Company ("Glacier"). When Glacier was placed in
rehabilitation and was unable to pay losses under the reinsurance agreement,
Gerling demanded that FIB make payments under the letter of credit. When FIB
refused to pay, Gerling sued in Montana state court; FIB moved for a change of
venue, claiming that the only permissible venue for hearing the case was the
liquidation court. The Montana Supreme Court held that the liquidation court
did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute because the letter of credit
represented a relationship between the bank and Gerling, and did not involve
any assets of the estate.
New Jersey Commissioner v. Mid‐Am. General Agency, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15214
(D.N.J. 1991). The New Jersey Federal District Court, in applying the Burford
abstention doctrine, declined jurisdiction in a matter which called the Court to
address provisions contained in the liquidation order. The matter was
remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, the court of original jurisdiction.
New York
Corcoran v. Haddon S. Fraser Assocs., Ltd., 171 A.D.2d 522, 567 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st
Dep't 1991). The Liquidator of the U.S. branch of Northumberland General
Insurance Company, a Canadian insurer, brought an action against the insolvent
company's officers, directors, and Haddon S. Fraser Associates, the corporation
that served as Northumberland's managing general agent. The defendants
moved to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of in
personam jurisdiction. The Court rejected defendants' forum non conveniens
claim, holding both that New York had sufficient nexus with the action and that
defendants failed to establish Canada as the more appropriate forum. The
Court also found that personal jurisdiction existed over the individual
defendants on the basis of both the doing‐business doctrine and the long‐arm
statute. Further, based in part on testimony that the corporate defendant
supervised the carrier's activities in New York without a sufficient degree of
separateness, the Court found jurisdiction over the managing general agent
under a veil‐piercing theory.