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financial institutions to transfer American Superior's assets to the Receiver
without executing any set‐off rights, and prohibited any transfers of assets
without the Receiver's consent. 999 So. 2d at 694‐95. Section 631.181, Florida
Statutes requires the filing of claims in the receivership court following the entry
of an Order of liquidation. Id. at 700.
Ocean Bank v. Fla. Dep't. Fin. Serv., 902 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (per
curiam), rev. dismissed, 944 So. 2d 251 (2006). Section 631.041(1), Florida
Statutes authorizes the receivership court to enter an Order initiating a
delinquency petition, which operates as an automatic stay applicable to all
persons and entities. 902 So. 2d 834.
Georgia Shaw v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 87, 189 S.E.2d 684 (1972). The court held that
provision for injunctions under the state insurance liquidation law must be read
in concert with the Civil Practice Act, which provides that injunctions are
binding only on those who are parties or receive notice. Thus, plaintiff, who
had no notice of injunction in Georgia ancillary proceeding could successfully
prosecute action against insolvent Tennessee insurer. The holding of this case
was later overruled by Statute. See, Short v. State, 235 Ga. 394, 219 S.E.2d 728
(1975).
Smith v. Farm & Home Life Ins. Co., 269 Ga. 709, 506 S.E.2d 104 (1998). An
insurer, which owned and held security interests on properties in Georgia,
was placed into receivership in Arizona. The receivership order enjoined
actions against the insurer’s assets. The county taxing authorities in Georgia
sought to levy upon the insurer’s properties for taxes. The trial court ruled
in favor of the receiver, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The Court
held that the Georgia and Arizona statutes were sufficiently similar to make
them reciprocal states. As a reciprocal state, Georgia was obligated to defer
to the Arizona proceeding, particularly since Georgia had not instituted an
ancillary proceeding.
Illinois
Korman v. Matthias, 31 Ill. App. 2d 341, 177 N.E.2d 720 (1961). The trial court's
temporary restraining order prohibiting the payment of the salaries of
management of an insolvent insurer was held to be improper since only the
insurance commissioner can make the preliminary determination as to
whether an injunction or restraining order which interferes with the business
of an insurance company can be entered pursuant to conservation,
rehabilitation or liquidation.
Mahan v. Gunther, 278 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 663 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
The plaintiff, an Illinois resident, filed suit after she was involved in a car
accident with the defendant's employee. The Illinois trial court entered an
order staying the plaintiff's lawsuit because the defendant's insurer was in
rehabilitation in Indiana and had obtained an antisuit injunction from an
Indiana court. The appellate court found that the State of Indiana could not
and did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff in this case, given
that she had no contacts with Indiana. In addition, the court held that there
is no constitutional compulsion on Illinois courts to give full faith and credit
or extend comity to foreign antisuit injunctions.
People ex rel. Parkinson v. Williams, 392 Ill. 224, 64 N.E.2d 464 (1946). The
court held the insurance code does not prohibit actions against insolvent
insurance companies, but instead prohibits the entry of orders enjoining,
restraining, or interfering with the prosecution of the business of an insolvent
insurance company. The court recognized that whether a particular order