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Court Order after determining the Texas Chancery Court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In reaching this conclusion, the Texas
court applied the conflict of laws rules of Texas; therefore, Texas applied
Tennessee law to the instant case as interpreted by Texas rather than
Tennessee. Accordingly the court herein was bound by a Texas appellate
court’s determination that the Tennessee chancery court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the property of Anchorage Fire and Casualty
Insurance Company assets located in the state of Texas. In this matter, the
Liquidator of Anchorage Fire & Casualty, a Tennessee insurer placed into
receivership, sought to recover assets located in Texas under the control of
Surety Bank, a lender who provided premium financing to insureds of
Anchorage.
Virginia
Bockover v. Life Association of America, 77 Va. 85 (1883). The plaintiff was
policyholder of a foreign company that had been declared insolvent. The
Missouri court had vested all assets of the company in the hands of a receiver.
The plaintiff attached, in a Virginia court, debts owed to the company by
Virginia residents. The company answered that debts were not subject to
attachment, and receiver intervened claiming to be entitled to the debts. It
was held that as the Missouri statute for winding up the insurer was valid, the
decree of the Missouri court vesting assets in receiver was valid, and would be
observed by Virginia. Attachments therefore would be dissolved.
Eastern Indemnity Co. of Maryland v. Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox &
Allen, 253 Va. 9, 366 S.E.2d 53 (1988). In a law firm's action against an insolvent
insurer to recover for legal services and disbursements, court orders entered in
the domiciliary delinquency proceeding in Maryland which prohibited actions,
judgments, liens or attachments against an insolvent insurer were held not
entitled to full faith and credit in Virginia because the law firm was neither a
party to nor given notice of the Maryland proceeding, and because the
Maryland court never litigated or decided its jurisdiction over the law firm.
Morrow v. Vaughn‐Bassett Furniture Co., Inc., 173 Va. 417, 4 S.E.2d 399 (1939).
A Virginia member of an insolvent Texas mutual insurer was assessed on a
policy. Although the Virginia resident was not a party to the Texas suit, it was
held that the assessment was valid as the Virginia resident was a party by
representation, and liability for the assessment attached while the Virginian
was a member of the company and while the company was in fact insolvent.
Washington
Wisconsin
American Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994). While a
declaratory judgment action brought by an insurer was pending, an order of
liquidation and permanent injunction were issued in respect of the insurer
pursuant to the Wisconsin Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. The Supreme
Court of Washington emphasized the need for interstate comity and
recognition of the Wisconsin liquidation proceeding. The court determined
that to the extent the action was against the insurer ‐‐ since the insured
sought affirmative action against the insurer in seeking a declaration that it
was entitled to coverage ‐‐ the Wisconsin Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act
called for abatement of the action. The court further determined that to the
extent the action was by the insolvent insurer, the liquidator had effectively
exercised his option under the Uniform Act to abandon the action.
In the Matter of the Liquidation of Executive Life Ins. Co., Fuhrmann v. Wis.
Ins. Sec. Fund, 218 Wis. 2d 832, 581 N.W.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished
disposition ‐ table only). Fara Fuhrmann was the beneficiary of a First
Executive (insolvent insurer) annuity. Fuhrmann voluntarily opted into the
supervisory California court’s rehabilitation plan. Because under the
calculation of benefits under the California court’s plan, Fuhrmann’s benefits
were lower than they would have been had she proceeded with a claim