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enterprise with United States General Agency (“USGA”) and American Funding<br />

Services, Inc. (“AFSI”), and was placed in receivership. A co‐owner of ANA sued<br />

the commissioner of insurance, as liquidator, for mismanagement of the<br />

receivership estate based on the liquidator’s conduct with respect to the sale of<br />

securities owned by USGA. Overruling the lower appellate court’s reasoning<br />

that a finding of a single business enterprise (“SBE”) makes the liquidator a<br />

fiduciary to the co‐owner of ANA, as if she were an owner of the entire SBE, the<br />

state supreme court held that an SBE makes the liquidator owner of all of the<br />

SBE’s assets, but that the owners of the individual entities of the SBE remain the<br />

same. Therefore, the co‐owner of ANA did not have standing to bring an action<br />

against the liquidator of USGA.<br />

Wooley v. Lucksinger, 961 So. 2d 1228 (La. Ct. App. 2007). Owner of an insolvent<br />

health plan filed a third‐party claim against the Department of Insurance in the<br />

same lawsuit where the Commissioner of Insurance, as liquidator of the same<br />

insolvent health plan, was pursuing causes of action against the owner for<br />

corporate mismanagement and accounting negligence. The owner sought<br />

indemnity, contribution, and governmental tort damages based on the<br />

Department’s alleged negligent enforcement of rules and regulations thereby<br />

allowing the health plan to fall deeper into insolvency. The owner also sought<br />

damages from the Department on the basis of detrimental reliance. The court<br />

of appeals held that, as a matter of law, the Department’s executing and<br />

applying its statutory functions are not promises for the purposes of a Louisiana<br />

statutory detrimental reliance claim or for public contract purposes. Therefore,<br />

the owner’s claim for detrimental reliance on this basis is legally nonexistent.<br />

The owner’s remaining third‐party demands of the Department could not be<br />

sustained because, under Louisiana law, a third‐party plaintiff must allege and<br />

prove that a third‐party defendant is liable to the plaintiff for all or part of the<br />

damage. The joint and divisible nature of negligence under the Louisiana<br />

statutes makes no damage award possible to the owner as co‐obligor.<br />

Therefore, because the Department is not liable to the owner for all or part of<br />

the demand, the owner also has no cause of action for third‐party demands as a<br />

matter of law.<br />

Missouri Avidan v. Transit Cas. Co., 20 S.W.3d 521 (2000). A former employee of a<br />

receivership filed suit against the receivership for breach of contract, and<br />

against both the receivership and the receiver for deprivation of his civil rights<br />

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The lower court dismissed the claim against the receiver<br />

based on statutory immunity. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of<br />

Missouri reversed and remanded, holding that the immunity provided to a<br />

deputy receiver for an insurance receivership initiated prior to August 28, 1991, is<br />

conditioned upon actions taken in “good faith” and it was error to dismiss a<br />

petition that had alleged the deputy receiver's actions were “willful, wanton<br />

and malicious.”<br />

Lucas v. Manufacturing Lumberman's Underwriters, 349 Mo. 835, 163 S.W.2d<br />

750 (1942). The new Missouri insurance commissioner filed charges against the<br />

prior insurance commissioner and secured a judgment of $85,264.44. In<br />

reversing this award, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that the Missouri<br />

commissioner had the authority during rehabilitation to preserve the status<br />

quo while awaiting the decision of various questions of jurisdiction pending<br />

before the state and federal courts concerning the reciprocal exchange, and<br />

this included the expending of funds for the purpose of reinsuring and<br />

maintaining as much as possible the status quo of the exchange. The<br />

insurance commissioner is vested with much discretion in conducting and

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