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ehabilitation in Indiana and had obtained an antisuit injunction from an<br />

Indiana court. The appellate court found that the State of Indiana could not<br />

and did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff in this case, given<br />

that she had no contacts with Indiana. In addition, the court held that there<br />

is no constitutional compulsion on Illinois courts to give full faith and credit<br />

or extend comity to foreign antisuit injunctions.<br />

People v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 63 N.E.2d 479 (1945) reversed, Morris v.<br />

Jones, 329 U.S. 545, rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 854. The court held that the full<br />

faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution is not authority for placing the<br />

foreign creditor who obtained a judgment in a better position in Illinois than<br />

such a creditor would be in Missouri.<br />

Republic Ins. Co. v. Maleski, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30,<br />

1994). Respondents, the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, moved to<br />

dismiss Republic's petition to confirm an arbitration award, and argued that<br />

Republic, was collaterally estopped from denying that the plan of<br />

rehabilitation gives the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court exclusive<br />

jurisdiction to rule on the arbitration award. The court held that both the<br />

Pennsylvania state courts and state statutes made clear that a lower state<br />

court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over pending proceedings "by or<br />

against an estate in rehabilitation." Therefore, the petitioner could deny<br />

that the plan of rehabilitation required that lower state court to rule on the<br />

arbitration award as it related to the rehabilitation plan. The court also ruled<br />

that there were insufficient grounds for Burford or Colorado River<br />

abstention.<br />

The court held that Burford abstention failed to apply to the case at bar<br />

because the state did not have a specialized proceeding for the evaluation of<br />

claims by or against an estate in rehabilitation. The court noted that of the<br />

two types of Burford abstention, the second type has two essential<br />

elements. First, a state must offer a forum in which to litigate the claims.<br />

Second, the forum has to be a specialized proceeding. Without Burford<br />

abstention, the court addressed whether Colorado River abstention applied.<br />

Because the case at bar had parallel suits in both the federal and state<br />

forums, the analysis could balance whether factors favored or disfavored a<br />

stay in the proceeding. After weighing ten factors including assumed<br />

jurisdiction, forum convenience, piecemeal litigation, order of jurisdiction,<br />

protection of rights, progress of proceedings, concurrent jurisdiction,<br />

availability of removal, and vexatious or contrived nature of the federal<br />

claim, the court held that the balance did not support abstention.<br />

Schacht v. Cadillac Ins. Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11606 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The<br />

Illinois Director of Insurance filed a complaint against an insolvent insurer,<br />

alleging that it made illegal transfers of funds from other insolvent insurers<br />

in violation of Section 204(3) of the Illinois Insurance Code. The court first<br />

rejected Cadillac's argument that the court should abstain from asserting its<br />

jurisdiction under the Burford abstention doctrine. Although the transfers<br />

were made from two Illinois insolvent insurers, now in conservation<br />

proceedings, in Illinois to a Michigan insolvent insurer, in liquidation<br />

proceedings in Michigan, the federal court's exercise of jurisdiction would<br />

not interfere with the state liquidation courts' equitable distribution powers.<br />

With respect to the Director's voidable preference claim, the court held that<br />

the fact that the first conservation complaint was dismissed by agreed order<br />

(although a second complaint was filed) did not affect the classification of<br />

the transfer as a voidable preference, since that transfer occurred within<br />

two years of the filing of the complaint. § 204(3) of the Illinois Insurance<br />

Code imposes liability for preferential transfers of assets upon those who

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