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full faith and credit in Louisiana. The court explained that a determination of
reciprocity required an independent examination of the two states’ receivership
statutes and not reliance on a cursory review of a non‐statutory table of
comparisons in an annotated statute volume.
Bonura v. United Bankers Life Insurance Co., 509 So. 2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
Louisiana court had subject matter jurisdiction in a coverage dispute between
Louisiana resident and an insolvent Texas domiciled insurer. The court held
that because Louisiana has adopted the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act and
Texas had not and was thus not a reciprocal state, the provisions of the
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Law are not applicable with respect to claims
against foreign insurers from Texas. However, the court held that under
Louisiana's Insurance Code, no insurance contract delivered or issued for
delivery in Louisiana which covers Louisiana residents may contain any
provision which deprives the courts of Louisiana of jurisdiction over actions
against the insurer. Thus, no foreign insurer may enjoy the benefits of a source
of business in Louisiana without being prepared to answer any claims based on
that business by a Louisiana resident in the Louisiana courts.
Bonura v. United Bankers Life Insurance Company, 552 So.2d 1248 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So.2d 1125 (La. 1990). On appeal, the court affirmed
its earlier holding [Bonura v. United Bankers Life Insurance Company, 509
So.2d 8 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 512 So.2d 462 (La. 1987)] that the
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act did not preclude Louisiana courts from
exercising jurisdiction over claims against an insolvent Texas domiciled
insurance company, because Texas is not a "reciprocal" state under that Act.
Krueger v. Tabor, 546 So.2d 1317 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1989). A receiver was
appointed for the insolvent insurance carrier, a Texas domiciliary. Although
certain intervenors and third party claimants properly served the receiver,
plaintiffs failed to do so. The receiver challenged judgment for the plaintiffs
alleging lack of jurisdiction due to improper service and judgment for
intervenors/third party claimants alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction
due to exclusive jurisdiction in the Texas liquidation court. The court reversed
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding the judgment null and void for the
reason that the receiver had not been served with process. The court upheld
judgment in favor of the intervenors and third party claimants (who had
properly served the receiver), finding the Louisiana courts had subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy because Texas is not a "reciprocal" state
under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. Therefore, the Louisiana claimants
were not required to bring their action in the Texas Court which appointed the
receiver.
New York Dean Construction Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 A.D.2d 82, 254 N.Y.S.2d 196
(1964). The court held that New York's adoption of the Uniform Insurers
Liquidation Act expressly confines to the reciprocal states the operation of its
common law rule of abatement where the dissolution of a foreign insurer
served to abate all actions pending against the insurer. Therefore, where
Pennsylvania was not a reciprocal state, the Pennsylvania receiver was not
vested by operation of law with title to an insurer's New York property and
could not sue to recover the assets, nor could Pennsylvania rely on abatement
to prevent actions against the insurer in New York to recover on its policies.
Kelly v. Overseas Investors, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 157, 264 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1965),reversed on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 622, 272 N.Y.S.2d 733, 219 N.E.2d
288. The court held that a retaliatory purpose should not be read into the
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. Absent the policy argument that withholding
comity and barring an insurance commissioner of a non‐reciprocal state from
suing in New York would eventually force the non‐reciprocal state to adopt the