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participate in the settlement negotiations. In disallowing the practice, the<br />

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the insolvency<br />

clause of a reinsurance agreement provided that all proceeds of reinsurance<br />

vested in the receiver of an insolvent ceding carrier and are considered an asset<br />

of the insolvent estate. The reinsurer could not "reduce its obligation by taking<br />

advantage of the willingness of the insured and the insured's obligee to take<br />

less because of the insolvency." 751 F.2d at 965.<br />

Ninth Circuit<br />

Bank Of New York v. Freemont General Corp 523 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2008). A<br />

parent insurance holding company unlawfully transferred funds belonging to<br />

a insolvent subsidiary insurance company and held in escrow account as a<br />

statutory deposit from a bank to itself without gaining approval from state<br />

insurance official. The bank reinstated the statutory deposit and brought<br />

suit for conversion and intentional interference with contract against the<br />

parent holding company. In an action for conversion, the court held, that<br />

because the bank knowingly permitted the transfer, the bank itself could not<br />

bring a claim for conversion. The court, however, permitted the bank to<br />

proceed on an intentional interference with contract claim against the<br />

parent holding company.<br />

Insurance Commissioner. v. Altus Fin. S.A., 540 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2008).<br />

Commissioner sought damages from a corporation that had conspired to<br />

fraudulently purchase assets of insolvent insurer. In a jury trial the court had<br />

excluded evidence of damages based on the value of offers submitted by other<br />

bidders for the assets. Based on the evidence permitted by the court, jury<br />

found that the commissioner had suffered no compensatory damages as a<br />

result of the actions of the conspiring party, but that the actions of the<br />

conspirator entitled the commissioner to $700 million in punitive damages. The<br />

Ninth Circuit held the absence of an award of compensatory damages<br />

established that the commissioner did not suffer actual damages and thus was<br />

not entitled to punitive damages. The court also held that the trial court had<br />

improperly excluded evidence of damages based on the alternative bids and<br />

that the commissioner was entitled to pursue the theory at the damages phase<br />

of the new trial.<br />

Arkansas Baldwin‐United Corp. v. Garner 283 Ark. 385, 678 S.W.2d 754 (1984). The<br />

insurance commissioner, as receiver of three insolvent insurance companies<br />

owned by one corporation, proposed a rehabilitation plan which was approved<br />

by the court. The parent corporation appealed the plan's provisions that: (i) the<br />

rehabilitation court had exclusive jurisdiction over the assets of the companies,<br />

and (ii) the rehabilitation court would refuse to honor a judgment obtained in<br />

any other forum. In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court of<br />

Arkansas announced that nothing contained in the McCarran‐Ferguson Act or<br />

the Bankruptcy Act prohibits a state form determining the rights of an insurance<br />

company's creditors. Furthermore, the appellate court added, the lower court<br />

properly ordered that all claims to the companies' assets be adjudicated in the<br />

rehabilitation court.<br />

California<br />

Garamendi v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th 504 (Ct. App. 1993). The<br />

California Court of Appeals found that a court overseeing an insurance<br />

insolvency proceeding has in rem jurisdiction over a third party's assets<br />

when that party has an "identity of interest" with the insolvent insurer, even<br />

if the party is not involved in the business of insurance. Prior to insolvency,<br />

the insurer formed and funded a separate partnership for the purpose of<br />

real estate investment. The court found that because the insurer had a<br />

substantial part of its business tied up in the partnership for the purpose of<br />

investing its capital, and this partnership accounted for 10% of the insurer's<br />

real estate investment, there was an "identity of interest" between the<br />

insurer and the partnership.

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