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medical malpractice action, which it settled. The Company filed a claim with the<br />

Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association (“OIGA”), seeking reimbursement for the<br />

settlement payment. Although the company’s claim was filed more than two<br />

years after the bar date, the Indiana liquidating court accepted the company’s<br />

claim as “timely filed.” OIGA, however, rejected the Company’s claim on the<br />

ground that it was not timely filed. The trial court granted OIGA’s motion for<br />

summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that<br />

OIGA was obligated to observe the finality of the bar date, pursuant to Ohio<br />

Revised Code § 3955.08(A)(1). The fact that the foreign jurisdiction allowed its<br />

domestic receiver to accept the untimely claim did not control the liability of<br />

OIGA.<br />

Lorain County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fire Ins. Co., C.A. NO.<br />

91CA005090, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 225 (Jan. 22, 1992). A New York court in a<br />

liquidation proceeding involving an insolvent insurer ordered that all claims<br />

against the insurer be submitted within one year. Over two years after the<br />

expiration of that one‐year period, an insured demanded coverage from the<br />

Ohio Insurance Guaranty Association ("OIGA") based on the insolvency of its<br />

insurers, one of which was the subject of the New York liquidation proceeding.<br />

On appeal, the Ohio court of appeals not only reversed the trial court's order<br />

granting summary judgment in favor of the insured, but also granted OIGA's<br />

motion for summary judgment because the claim was filed with the OIGA after<br />

the final date set by the New York court for filing claims in the liquidation<br />

proceeding involving the insurer. The court declined to use equitable<br />

principles in order to circumvent the statute providing that OIGA is not liable<br />

for late claims.<br />

Ohio Insurance Guarantee Association v. Berea Roll & Bowl, Inc., 19 Ohio<br />

Misc.2d 3, 482 N.E.2d 995 (1984). The Ohio statute which permits the court to<br />

set the final date for the filing claims in liquidation proceedings of an insolvent<br />

insurer, superseded the two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury<br />

actions, and thus, precluded claims against the insurance guaranty fund arising<br />

out of personal injury actions against insureds which were not brought until<br />

after the last day for filing claims, as the statute benefits claimants and<br />

policyholders of insolvent companies in that without such a provision,<br />

liquidation or distribution would not be effected until all potential statutes of<br />

limitations have run.<br />

Ratchford v. Proprietors Insurance Company, Ohio Ct. of Appeals, Docket No.<br />

84 AP‐911 (Slip Op. 1985). After date is set by court as deadline for filing claims<br />

against insolvent insurance company, the court will not modify the cut‐off date<br />

to consider the claims as timely filed. The court held that pursuant to the Ohio<br />

statute governing proofs of claims, the court has no discretion to consider<br />

claims to have been timely filed because of equitable considerations.<br />

Oklahoma<br />

Pennsylvania<br />

Homeland Ins. Co. v. Rankin, 1993 Okla. 19, 848 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1993). In<br />

order to satisfy due process notice requirements in cases where identities of<br />

interested persons are known or reasonably ascertainable, publication<br />

notice is not sufficient. Therefore, a claim for compensation from the<br />

Oklahoma Guaranty Fund was not barred even though the claimant did not<br />

file it before the deadline specified by the Insurance Commissioner.<br />

Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Seaboard Mutual Casualty Co., 30 D.& C.2d<br />

705, 80 Dauph. 289 (1963), exceptions dismissed, 83 Dauph. 373 (1965). After a<br />

decree of dissolution has been entered, a pending suit against an insurance<br />

company could not be maintained. The plaintiffs were required to present their<br />

claims to the commissioner of insurance as liquidator.

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