Download PDF - Goodmans

ond in conjunction with the preliminary injunction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(C),
absent proof of likelihood of harm.
Van Schaick v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 252 A.D. 188, 297 N.Y.S. 827 (1937).
The insurance code provides for an injunction against all other persons,
including creditors, from interfering with the insurance commissioner and from
prosecuting any actions against the corporation or its assets.
Ohio Benjamin v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 167 Ohio App. 3d 350, 358 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
This case affirmed the finding by the Court of Claims, which held that under
Ohio Revised Code § 3903.04(B), only the court of common pleas has
jurisdiction to entertain “any complaint praying for the dissolution, liquidation,
rehabilitation, sequestration, conservation, or restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or permanent injunction, or other relief preliminary to, incidental to,
or relating to delinquency proceedings other than in accordance with sections
3903.01 to 3903.59 of the Revised Code.” Thus, the court found that the
superintendent as liquidator was not subject to counterclaims arising from acts
or omissions of the superintendent in her capacity as regulator.
Boedeker v. Rogers, 140 Ohio App. 3d 11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). The insurer was
placed in liquidation, and intervenor, the liquidator, was allowed to intervene in
the action. The intervenor appealed the denial of his motion for an order
substituting him as the plaintiff in the action representing policyholders of the
insurer pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3903. The court reversed in part
and remanded, finding that the intervenor should have been substituted as the
plaintiff with respect to plaintiffs’ derivative claims. The court affirmed in part,
however, because the intervenor was not entitled to be substituted as the
plaintiff on the individual claims.
Ti‐Bert Systems, Inc. v. Union Indem. Ins. Co., No. 14207, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS
2160 (Ohio Ct. App. May 30, 1990). The Supreme Court of New York issued an
order of liquidation that stayed all proceedings against the insolvent insurance
company and its successor‐in‐interest. Affirming the lower court's judgment
enforcing that order, the Ohio appellate court found that actions taken by the
successor‐in‐interest subsequent to the filing of the order of liquidation did not
constitute a waiver of the protection of the stay. The liquidation order
imposed a stay of proceedings against the insurance company and its
successor‐in‐interest only; it did not impose a stay on actions brought by those
parties.
Pennsylvania
Foster v. Berwind Corp. Civil Action No. 90‐0857, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1988 (E.D.
Pa. 2/13/91). Pennsylvania District Court applied Pennsylvania choice of law
rules and Pennsylvania law to govern an action brought by the Pennsylvania
Commissioner of Insurance to pierce the corporate veil of a defunct Bermuda
subsidiary (Norad) and hold the defendant liable for reinsurance loss claims of
the insolvent Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Island Co. The court held that
Pennsylvania's interest in investigating the claims of its domiciliaries against its
own corporations outweighed Bermuda's interest in regulating its reinsurance
industry where the subsidiary is "exempt" because it does not "do business".
Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., No. 91‐1179, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 1992). Defendant reinsurer and its parent companies
moved for an order permitting interlocutory appeal of the district court's
finding that a statutory rehabilitator of an insolvent Pennsylvania insurance
company has standing to assert claims common to the insurance company's
policyholders and other creditors. The district court denied the motion