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the company in that other state to claim, the Supreme Court could punish the
creditor for contempt.
Matter of People v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 436, 175 N.E. 121 (1931).
Once the insurance commissioner completed liquidation of the assets of a
branch of an insolvent Russian insurance corporation, it was permissible to
modify the injunction in the order of liquidation so as to allow assignment
without preference for a creditor's benefit, and also to allow a creditor to sue
and to enforce legal rights.
Muhl v. Trabucchi, 673 N.Y.S.2d.103 (App. Div. 1998). A consent order
prohibiting the transfer of any of an insolvent reinsured’s assets “located
anywhere in the United States,” also prohibited the transfer of funds to
Bermuda; the order encompassed the transfer of any assets that were located
in the United States regardless of where the assets were transferred.
People, by Beha, Sup't of Insurance v. Russian Reinsurance Co., 255 N.Y. 415,
175 N.E. 114 (1931). Once the insurance commissioner completed liquidation of
the New York branches of an insolvent Russian insurance company, which
were taken possession of in order to conserve assets for the benefit of entitled
parties, the court should have continued an injunction which restrained
creditors with claims not arising out of domestic business from pursuing their
legal remedies.
Pink v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 167, 8 N.E.2d 321 (1937),
reargument denied, 274 N.Y. 610, 10 N.E.2d 575. When the insurance
commissioner took possession of the affairs of an insolvent mortgage
guarantee company under an order of rehabilitation, the court held that all
persons including the insolvent company are enjoined from interfering with
the assets of the insolvent insurer or from obtaining a preference or from
bringing any action or other proceeding at law or in equity against the
insolvent or its assets or against the commissioner.
Powell v. All City Ins. Co., 74 A.D.2d 942, 426 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1980). Where one
judge enjoined all parties from commencing or further prosecuting any action
against an insolvent insurance company or its assets, both the first order of a
second judge directing that the trial of an action against such insurer
commence and the second order of the second judge to postpone the trial's
commencement contradicted the purpose and intent of the insurance code,
that being the promotion of orderly, court‐supervised proceedings.
Schenck v. Coordinated Coverage Corp., 50 A.D.2d 50, 376 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1975)
and Schenck v. Citizens Casualty Co., 66 Misc.2d 811, 322 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1971).
An injunction prohibiting counterclaims is necessarily implied in an order of
liquidation which contains an injunction staying all suits against an insurance
company during liquidation, even though the order does not mention
counterclaims.
Serio v. Black, Davis & Shue Agency, Inc., No. 05 CIV. 15 (MHD), 2005 WL 3642217
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005), stay denied, No. 05 CIV. 15 (MHD), 2006 WL 156395
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006). The Insurance Superintendent as rehabilitator sued to
recover premiums allegedly owed to the insolvent insurer under an agency
agreement, and also sought an injunction requiring the defendant agency to
deposit security representing premiums not transmitted to the insurer. The
court held that the rehabilitator satisfied preliminary injunction requisites and
ordered that sums be deposited, but would not require the liquidator to post