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McConnell v. Industrial Indemnity Co. 219 Cal. App. 2d 809, 333 Cal. Rptr. 418<br />

(1963). The insurance commissioner persuaded a group of insurance<br />

companies to execute an agreement providing for the reinsurance and<br />

assumption of liabilities of an insolvent insurer's worker compensation policies.<br />

The court concluded that the receiver of the insolvent insurer was obligated<br />

first to transfer to the reinsurers, which had undertaken such workman's<br />

compensation obligations, the funds collected in liquidation, to the extent of<br />

the liabilities under the workers' compensation policies. This was to be done<br />

before the claims of general creditors of the defunct insurer were satisfied.<br />

Texas Commerce Bank v. Garamendi, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1234 (Ct. App. 1994).<br />

As prevailing parties in a declaratory judgment action challenging the<br />

Commissioner's failure to designate their priority status as that of<br />

policyholders, the appellants were entitled to an award of attorney fees and<br />

costs as provided for in their investment contracts with the insurance<br />

company.<br />

W. J. Jones & Son v. Independence Indemnity Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 374, 126 P.2d<br />

463 (1942). Under the insurance code, the commissioner has the duty to<br />

collect the assets and distribute them ratably among the creditors subject to<br />

certain priorities which appear in the code.<br />

Colorado<br />

District of Columbia<br />

H.M.O. Systems, Inc. v. Choicecare Health Services, Inc., 665 P.2d 635 (Colo.<br />

App. 1983). This case involved a judgment for breach of lease and breach of<br />

contract against an insurer put into receivership because of insolvency. The<br />

court held that the money judgment in favor of the creditor was a "class IV"<br />

claim of a general creditor since the creditor did not have an ownership<br />

interest in the leased equipment.<br />

Consumers United Insurance Company v. Smith, et al., 644 A.2d 1328 (D.C.<br />

1994). Consumers United Insurance Company (“CUIC”), a Delaware insurer<br />

with its main office in the District of Columbia, sued its D.C. landlord in D.C.<br />

Superior Court to rescind its lease, alleging asbestos issue. The landlord<br />

countersued for rent and was awarded a judgment of $2.5 million. After the<br />

landlord attempted to execute on the judgment, the Delaware Insurance<br />

Department seized CUIC’s assets and obtained an injunction in Delaware<br />

state court against further claims. The landlord ignored the Delaware<br />

injunction and pursued its remedies in D.C. including the execution of its<br />

judgment against a building transferred post‐judgment from CUIC to its<br />

parent in return for a note against cash in a bank account. The Court of<br />

Appeals posed the question presented as: “To what extent does the<br />

appointment of a receiver for a Delaware insurance company by a chancery<br />

court in Delaware – a state which has enacted the Uniform Insurers’<br />

Liquidation Act…prevent a judgment creditor from executing on the<br />

insurance company’s property located in the District of Columbia?” Prior to<br />

the appointment of the receiver in Delaware, the landlord had served an<br />

attachment on CUIC’s bank; a later attachment suggested additional funds<br />

had been received by the bank. Held, landlord was entitled to those funds in<br />

the bank at the time of the first attachment; additional cash collected after<br />

the appointment of the receiver could not be attached by the landlord. The<br />

transfer of the building to the parent company to protect it from attachment<br />

was a fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law and thus ineffective. The<br />

landlord’s lien, since it predated the receivership, could not be enforced by<br />

foreclosure. Further, because the District of Columbia (unlike Delaware) had<br />

not adopted the Uniform Liquidation of Insurers Act, the Delaware receiver<br />

was not vested with title to the assets in question. The court further<br />

declined to adopt the ULIA’s scheme of priorities as a matter of D.C.<br />

common law.

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