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proceeding was pending was not a jurisdictional statute, but rather a
mandatory and exclusive venue provision. Accordingly, the trial court had
jurisdiction to order the action severed. The court rejected the receiver's policy
defenses finding that when an insurance carrier denies all liability and refuses
to defend, the receiver for that carrier cannot thereafter rely upon policy
defenses to defeat the claim. The court also rejected the receiver's claim that
because the insolvent primary carrier had not paid its policy limits, the
insolvent excess carrier was not liable.
Durish v. Newberry, 800 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.‐‐Houston [14th Dist.] 1990).
Receiver appealed an adverse judgment alleging that the venue provision in
the insurance code was exclusive and asserting that the trial court erred in
refusing to transfer the case to the county in which the receivership
proceeding was pending. The court agreed, reversed the judgment against the
receiver and remanded with orders to transfer, finding that the more specific
insurance statutes controlled over any conflicting venue provisions in the
worker's compensation laws.
Durish v. Panan International, N.V., 808 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.‐‐Houston [14th
Dist.] 1991). Corporation brought suit against title insurer, for which a receiver
was subsequently appointed. Receiver claimed the action should have been
abated, pending the filing and rejection of a proof of claim in the receivership
proceeding, and a transfer of venue to the receivership court. The court held
that the provisions of the insurance code relied upon by the receiver apply only
to lawsuits brought after delinquency proceedings had been commenced, not
to lawsuits pending at the time of insolvency. The court further rejected the
receiver's claim that liability against him, as receiver, had not been proven,
observing that he was sued in his capacity as receiver, not individually, and that
as receiver, he stood in the place of the insolvent carrier. Thus, entry of
judgment against him was proper.
Glau‐Moya Parapsychology Training Institute, Inc. v. Royal Life Ins. Co., 500
S.W.2d 884 (Texas Civ. App. 1973). The court held that a suit filed by an
insurance company in conservatorship, as opposed to suit filed against it, is not
subject to the mandatory venue provision of the insurance code.
Johnson v. Langdeau, 326 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). In a class action
filed by policyholders of insolvent insurer to enjoin the receiver from selling
land owned by the insolvent insurer or otherwise disposing of its assets, and
the suit was brought in county where land was located, rather than in county
of residence of receiver. It was held that the Texas Civil Statutes confined
jurisdiction to the county of residence of receiver, and thus, this suit must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Johnson v. Wheeler, 312 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). When the receiver of
insurance company and finance corporation brought action on a note due
from the finance company, the court held that venue provisions of the
insurance liquidation law were controlling, since insurance company held the
beneficial interest in the note. "Action or proceeding" as used in code means
any action or proceeding that is recognizable in a court of law.
Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 351 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961),
affirmed, 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962). Plaintiffs filed actions to remove
encumbrances on land in the county where the land was located. The receiver
pled a privilege to be sued in Travis County, where delinquency proceedings
related to the land had been commenced, pursuant to the venue provision of