Download PDF - Goodmans

usiness and had informed brokers and agents that the company was not
authorized. Nevertheless, the federal court held that the remedy for illegal or
malicious actions by the insurance commissioner lay in the state courts or
before a federal district court judge.
United Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 90‐7625, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12336
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1992). Insurance company brought action against two other
insurers seeking a declaration that it was entitled to contribution from them for
a settlement by it of a personal injury claim. Defendant insurer involved in
liquidation proceedings in a foreign state court moved for summary judgment
against both plaintiff and co‐defendant insurers and for a stay of the declaratory
judgment action in light of the liquidation proceedings pending against it. The
district court found that the defendant had been prejudiced by post‐settlement
notice of the personal injury claim and was, therefore, not liable for
contribution. The court granted defendant's summary judgment motion and
denied the stay. The court reasoned that federal abstention under Burford
would be inappropriate in this case because the summary judgment would in no
way disrupt or impede the liquidation proceedings filed against the defendant in
state court.
Puerto Rico
Texas
Phico Ins. Co. v. Pavia Health, Inc., 413 F. Supp 2d 76 (D. P.R. 2006). In dicta, the
Court said that the question whether a setoff could be applied as a counterclaim
against the insurer in liquidation was not a matter that would “threaten state
policy,” and that therefore, the federal court would not abstain from
adjudicating the case.
Bryant v. Shields, Britton & Fraser, 930 S.W.2d 836. (Tex. App. 1996). The
Tennessee insurance commissioner, as liquidator of Anchorage Fire &
Casualty Insurance Company (AFCIC), appealed a judgment of the Texas
court, which failed to give the Tennessee receivership court’s liquidation
order full faith and credit. The court in its ruling held that the liquidation
order of the Tennessee court was a final judgment and therefore should be
afforded full faith and credit. It also stated that the injunction issued along
with the liquidation order should be afforded full faith and credit, and that
the trial court erred in not dismissing plaintiff’s action for payment of
attorney’s fees owed to it by (AFCIC).
State of Tennessee v. Surety Bank, N.A., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12076 (N.D.
Texas, Dallas Div. 1998) Court refused full, faith and credit to Texas Chancery
Court Order after determining the Texas Chancery Court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In reaching this conclusion, the Texas
court applied the conflict of laws rules of Texas; therefore, Texas applied
Tennessee law to the instant case as interpreted by Texas rather than
Tennessee. Accordingly the court herein was bound by a Texas appellate
court’s determination that the Tennessee chancery court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the property of Anchorage Fire and Casualty
Insurance Company assets located in the state of Texas. In this matter, the
Liquidator of Anchorage Fire & Casualty, a Tennessee insurer placed into
receivership, sought to recover assets located in Texas under the control of
Surety Bank, a lender who provided premium financing to insureds of
Anchorage.
Tapiador v. North American Lloyds of Texas, 778 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App. ‐‐
Houston [1st Dist.]1989). After appeal was filed, insurance carrier was declared
insolvent. Appellants sought to add the receiver as a party on appeal, and
receiver resisted claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over him until such