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First Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. Higgins, 357 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1962). A claimant<br />

against an insured of the insolvent insurer made a claim on its reinsurance<br />

contract. Rejecting the trial court's ruling that only the Missouri insurance<br />

commissioner as the receiver of the insolvent insurer was entitled to judgment<br />

against the reinsurer, the court found that the reinsurance contract, which is<br />

generally paid only to the reinsured company or its receiver in the event of<br />

insolvency, had been worded in such a way that insureds of the insolvent<br />

insurer were third‐party beneficiaries of the reinsurance contract.<br />

General Reinsurance Corporation v. Missouri General Ins. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 1<br />

(W.D. Mo. 1977). An interpleader action was brought to determine whether<br />

the Missouri receiver of an insolvent insurer or the Mississippi guaranty fund<br />

which had paid the insolvent insurer's claims in Mississippi, was entitled to the<br />

proceeds of the reinsurance contract issued to the insolvent insurer. The court<br />

held the proceeds should be paid to the domiciliary liquidator based on the<br />

insolvency clause of the reinsurance agreement and rejected the guaranty<br />

fund's statutory language that the association's "stood in the shoes" of the<br />

insolvent insurer and the argument that "public policy" held that the<br />

reinsurance proceeds should be paid to the guaranty fund.<br />

Green v. American Life and Accident Ins. Co., 112 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. App. 1938). A<br />

reinsurer denied a death claim filed by the beneficiary of policies issued by an<br />

insolvent primary company whose policies were assumed by the reinsurer.<br />

The insolvent insurer's policies were cancelled upon the insolvency and<br />

appointment of the receiver, and although such policies were reinsured, the<br />

assumption of liability was set forth in the reinsurance contract. As a result,<br />

since the original policies had lapsed due to nonpayment of premiums, there<br />

was no reserve available to be applied toward the purchase of coverage under<br />

the reinsurance contract, and the denial was proper.<br />

Homan v. Employer's Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo. 650, 136 S.W.2d 289 (1939).<br />

Based on the language of the reinsurance contract, the court found that the<br />

claimant of the insolvent insurer could maintain a direct action against the<br />

reinsurer.<br />

O'Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1959). In upholding a claimant's action<br />

against the reinsurer of the insolvent insurance company, the court noted that<br />

the reinsurance treaty in question provided for 100% cession of all of the<br />

insolvent insurers liability, that the reinsurer would takeover loss reserves and<br />

service, adjust, and settle claims directly with insureds, that reinsurance should<br />

be payable without diminution to the insolvent insurer's insureds in the event<br />

of insolvency, and the liability of the reinsurer followed the terms and<br />

conditions of the policy. The court ignored the further retrocession and quota<br />

share agreement whereby 50% of the risk was retroceded back to the insolvent<br />

insurer.<br />

New Jersey<br />

Fortunato v. New Jersey Life Ins., 254 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1991). The<br />

Appellate Division held that the Chancery Division should not have denied the<br />

Commissioner's request for an order directing him to rehabilitate New Jersey<br />

Life Insurance Company. The Chancery judge had refused to grant the request<br />

for rehabilitation because there were issues of fact concerning the existence of<br />

insolvency, including the issue of whether a reinsurance agreement had been<br />

repudiated. The reinsurance issue was scheduled for arbitration at a later date.<br />

While the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act [N.J.S.A. 17B:32‐2, before<br />

amendment by P.L.1992, c. 65] gives the Superior Court original jurisdiction<br />

over the Commissioner's petition, it does not require a full hearing before the<br />

court issues orders. The Commissioner's determination that further business<br />

by the insurer would be hazardous was a finding of fact, an informed

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