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usiness. Thereafter, an order of liquidation was entered against the insurers in<br />

their respective states and the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner was<br />

appointed ancillary receiver of the Missouri insurer. Both insurers then<br />

excepted to subject matter jurisdiction and venue. The appellate court<br />

affirmed the dismissal of the action based on lack of subject matter<br />

jurisdiction. The court noted that both Louisiana and Missouri have adopted<br />

the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act and that the Act's "statutory scheme for<br />

receiverships is comprehensive and exclusive" [emphasis by court].<br />

Accordingly, all persons asserting claims, including the plaintiff state officials,<br />

were required to file in the parish court in which the liquidations were pending,<br />

or, in the case of the Missouri insurer, in the parish court in which the ancillary<br />

receiver had been appointed. The Court rejected a claim that the objection<br />

was to venue and had therefore been waived.<br />

New Jersey<br />

New York<br />

Ballesteros v. New Jersey Property Liability Insurance Guaranty Association,<br />

530 F. Supp. 1367 (D. N.J. 1982), affirmed, 696 F.2d 980 (3rd Cir. 1982). The<br />

federal district court found that the New York Supreme Court had subject<br />

matter jurisdiction to enter a rehabilitation order against an insurer located<br />

outside the court's judicial district. Here, the insurance commissioner<br />

petitioned for an order of rehabilitation against an insurer in the district where<br />

the company was located. The broad jurisdiction of the court was deemed to<br />

be neither qualified nor limited by the state legislature. The court found that<br />

the provision requiring the commissioner to make an application in the judicial<br />

district in which the principal office of the insurer involved is located dealt only<br />

with venue and as such did not detract from the court's broad discretion.<br />

Frontier Ins. Co. v. Big Apple Roofing Co., 855 N.Y.S.2d 702 (App. Div. 2008). The<br />

court denied a motion for change of venue in a lawsuit filed by the insurer in<br />

liquidation for indemnification under a performance bond, where the defendant<br />

obligors who requested transfer failed to establish that convenience of material<br />

witnesses would be promoted by a change of venue.<br />

In re Board of Directors of Hopewell Internat’l Ins. Ltd., 275 B.R. 699 (S.D.N.Y.<br />

2002). The directors of a foreign reinsurer in run‐off adopted a scheme of<br />

arrangement providing that all disputes be submitted to binding arbitration in<br />

Bermuda under Bermuda law. A petition for an ancillary case to aid in the<br />

enforcement of the scheme of arrangement between the reinsurer in run‐off<br />

and its creditors was properly venued in the Southern District of New York<br />

where, among other things, the reinsurer’s principal assets in the U.S. were<br />

located in New York.<br />

Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. v. Holz, 4 N.Y.2d 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602, 149 N.E.2d<br />

885 (1958). The New York Supreme Court, with the insurance commissioner as<br />

its agent, was intended to have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against and<br />

for an insurance company in liquidation under the insurance code. There is no<br />

express provision requiring the commissioner to prosecute such claims only in<br />

the state Supreme Court. However, in keeping with the overall scheme and<br />

plan of the insurance code, the Supreme Court may not be divested of<br />

jurisdiction in favor of an arbitration tribunal.<br />

Ohio<br />

Lerenman v. Ohio German Fire Ins. Co., 21 Ohio Dec. 269 (1910). Although<br />

jurisdiction may be obtained over a dissolved company in an action brought for<br />

an accounting in other than the county in which its principal place of business is<br />

located, such jurisdiction does not extend to the trustees individually who are<br />

administering the affairs of the insolvent company, and therefore the court<br />

correctly quashed service as to the trustees in their individual capacities.

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