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Powers and Duties of the Rehabilitator or Liquidator<br />

U.S. Supreme<br />

Second Circuit<br />

Third Circuit<br />

Relf v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222 (1879). The Louisiana policyholders of an insolvent<br />

insurer instituted a proceeding in Louisiana for the appointment of a receiver,<br />

and five days later, the Missouri insurance commissioner instituted<br />

proceedings against the same insurer and was appointed liquidator. The<br />

liquidator intervened in the Louisiana state court proceedings and filed a<br />

petition for removal to the federal court. The U.S. Supreme Court, in<br />

upholding the Missouri liquidator's right to remove the case to federal court,<br />

reviewed the legal standing of the Missouri liquidator noting that the liquidator<br />

(1) is not an officer of a Missouri state court but is a statutory receiver entitled<br />

to hold and dispose of all of the assets of an insolvent insurance company for<br />

the benefit of insureds; and (2) is the statutory successor of the insolvent<br />

company; (3) is an officer of the state and represents the state in insolvency or<br />

performing its public duties in winding up the affairs of an insolvent company;<br />

(4) has authority from statute and not from a decree of the court; (5) is a<br />

trustee of an express trust; and (6) every Louisiana policyholder and creditor is<br />

charged with the knowledge that the insurer would be dissolved under<br />

Missouri laws and the Missouri commissioner appointed liquidator.<br />

Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd., 842 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1988). The court dismissed<br />

an appeal claiming that the district court had abused its discretionary power<br />

when it decided to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. New York's complex<br />

administrative and judicial system for regulating and liquidating domestic<br />

insurers, the court explained, is the type of regulatory scheme that indicates<br />

the court should seriously consider abstention from asserting jurisdiction when<br />

it faces a novel question. It added that state courts should first define the<br />

powers of the Superintendent.<br />

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Hunt, 107 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1939). The<br />

insurance commissioner liquidating an insurance company is required to<br />

liquidate, as an asset, a claim for alleged embezzlement against the company's<br />

president and to maintain a lien on the stock of the president.<br />

General Glass Industries Corp. v. Monsour Medical Foundation, 973 F.2d 197<br />

(3rd Cir 1992). Plaintiff, on behalf of its 300 workers, brought RICO, ERISA and<br />

Commonwealth tort claims against the Company's employee health insurer in<br />

liquidation (Keystone Medical Services and its successor, Monsour Medical<br />

Foundation). The Third Circuit vacated so much of the District Court's order<br />

dismissing plaintiff's claims that were broader than, or different from, those<br />

asserted by the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Insurance in the<br />

Commonwealth court action and declared that the Federal action be stayed<br />

during the pendency of the liquidation proceedings. The retention of<br />

jurisdiction by the District Court was hoped to avoid any applicable statute of<br />

limitations defense.<br />

University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick & Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3rd Cir. 1991). The<br />

Third Circuit vacated an Order dismissing the policy holders' Amended<br />

Complaint and remanded to the Pennsylvania District Court an action brought<br />

against the independent auditor (Peat Marwick) of insolvent Mutual Fire,<br />

Marine and Inland Insurance Company, holding that Burford and Colorado<br />

River abstention doctrines did not apply to bar the Federal action because (1) it<br />

did not appear that the Commonwealth court would have jurisdiction over the<br />

policyholder(s)' claims in the insolvency estate but rather a third party (Peat<br />

Marwick); (2) the policyholder(s)' claims were distinct from those brought by

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