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members. The court further held that the assessment is a decree which sets
forth the rate of liability, but that the liability, but the liability of each member
assessed would have to be established by the receiver.
Michigan
Bakon v. Clyne, 70 Mich. 183, 48 N.W. 207 (1888). Where the statute provides
that the defendant shall recover costs when a plaintiff obtains a judgment for
less than $100 and another statute provides that where one insured in a mutual
fire company shall neglect to pay an assessment, the receiver of the company
may sue for it, and the assessment shall be prima facie evidence of its own
regularity and of the receiver's right to recover, with costs, the receiver for an
insolvent insurer was permitted to recover costs although the judgment was
for less than $100.
Calkins v. Angell, 123 Mich. 77, 81 N.W. 977 (1900). Reversing the trial court, the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that the defendant, a member and
policyholder at the time the petition for dissolution of a mutual insurance
company was filed, is liable to the receiver for assessments levied to pay death
claims which had accrued prior to the filing for dissolution.
Cavanagh v. Connon, 123 Mich. 685, 82 N.W. 523 (1900). The court reversed a
judgment in favor of a policyholder of a mutual fire insurance company. The
court held that the holder, even after he had cancelled his policy, must pay the
assessment for losses and expenses incurred during the life of his policy, in an
action by the receiver of the company to cover a deficiency in the sum
necessary to pay the losses and expenses of the insolvent company.
Central Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Gauss, 292 Mich. 309, 290 N.W. 808 (1940). The
receiver of a mutual insurance company could not levy assessments on
members whose policies had expired over one year prior to appointment of
receiver and over two years prior to filing of petition by receiver for authority
to levy assessments, where, when the receiver was appointed, neither the
company nor its officers could have imposed any such assessments.
Collins v. Welch, 141 Mich. 676, 105 N.W. 31 (1905). In an action by the receiver
of an insolvent mutual fire insurance company to enforce the assessment
ordered by the circuit court judge to be paid by each member of the company,
the court held that a member of the company cannot collaterally attach the
order levying the assessment on the ground that the assessment is excessive.
Coy v. Lapeer Farmers' Mutual Fire Insurance Association, 327 Mich. 333, 41
N.W.2d 888 (1950). Where statutory receiver was appointed, and the method
of settlement, including voluntary contributions of those who had not paid
their assessments, and the final account of the receiver, were approved, and
the receiver was authorized to sell assets of the association to trustees for
benefit of its creditors, a suit by former members of association to vacate
assessment orders on the ground of fraud, which was discovered in 1942, and
not brought to light until 1948, when the suit was instituted, was barred by
latches.
Keehn v. Charles J. Rogers, Inc., 311 Mich. 416, 18 N.W.2d 877 (1945). In an
action by a receiver to collect an assessment where no demand for the
payment of the assessment was made within one year after termination of
policy, though the policyholder was an insured within one year preceding the
liquidation proceedings, there was no liability for the assessment, as the
statute governing Illinois mutual insurance companies, which fails to fix limits
as to time when assessment against policyholders can be demanded, does not
extend beyond territorial limits of that state. The remedy of the Illinois
receiver in suing a Michigan corporation in Michigan courts can be effective in
Michigan only on grounds of comity and not by constitutional mandate.