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Rhulen advanced claim payments to Transit customers in return for claim<br />

assignments. Rhulen then brought suit against various state guaranty<br />

associations for reimbursement on advanced claims. The Second Circuit<br />

affirmed a dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that<br />

since the guaranty associations were unincorporated associations, their<br />

citizenship was deemed the same as the citizenship of their members. The<br />

Second Circuit found that since at least one insurance company member of<br />

each guaranty association was a New York citizen, subject matter jurisdiction<br />

did not exist due to the incomplete diversity of the parties.<br />

Third Circuit<br />

Arkansas<br />

Colorado<br />

University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick & Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3rd Cir. 1991). The<br />

Third Circuit vacated an Order dismissing the policy holders' Amended<br />

Complaint and remanded to the Pennsylvania District Court an action brought<br />

against the independent auditor (Peat Marwick) of insolvent Mutual Fire,<br />

Marine and Inland Insurance Company, holding that Burford and Colorado<br />

River abstention doctrines did not apply to bar the Federal action because (1) it<br />

did not appear that the Commonwealth court would have jurisdiction over the<br />

policyholder(s)' claims in the insolvency estate but rather a third party (Peat<br />

Marwick); (2) the policyholder(s)' claims were distinct from those brought by<br />

the Commissioner of Insurance on behalf of the insolvent insurer in the<br />

Commonwealth court action; and (3) the action was at law, not in equity, and<br />

sought only money damages. 2 Hence, both the District Court and<br />

Commonwealth Court actions were allowed to proceed simultaneously.<br />

Larey v. Morris, 432 S.W.2d 861 (Ark. 1968). The court noted the Arkansas<br />

insurance commissioner had made a mistake in stating that the insolvent<br />

insurer was "not obligated to pay the judgment" against the former insured.<br />

The court noted that the claimant against the insured motorist could always<br />

attempt to collect a judgment directly from the insured or pursue the claim in<br />

the insolvent insurance company's estate.<br />

Benham v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. 685 P.2d 249 (Colo. App.<br />

1984). The court held that although an alleged impropriety by the Insurance<br />

Commissioner may justify a third party action against the Commissioner, the<br />

subscriber is still responsible for payment of the assessment.<br />

Connecticut Connecticut Ins. Guar. Assoc. v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 575 A.2d 693<br />

(1990). Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association ("CIGA") was statutorily<br />

created to pay claims of policyholders of insolvent insurers. Consequently,<br />

CIGA serves as a resource for persons injured by asbestos manufacturers,<br />

many of whose insurers have been declared insolvent. An injured party having<br />

a claim against an insured tortfeasor has a legal interest in a coverage dispute<br />

with the tortfeasor's insurer and must be either notified or joined in a<br />

declaratory judgment action to decide the coverage question. Accordingly, in<br />

the absence of some representative of those having a personal injury claim,<br />

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action<br />

brought by CIGA, which was acting in place of the insolvent insurer of an<br />

asbestos manufacturer.<br />

Connecticut Ins. Guar. Assoc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 217 Conn. 371, 585 A.2d<br />

1216 (1991). The Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association ("CIGA") became<br />

obligated to pay claims arising from a Union Carbide plant disaster in Bhopal,<br />

India after some of the Union Carbide's carriers became insolvent. The<br />

Connecticut Supreme Court held that, under the statutory definition of<br />

2 On remand, the Pennsylvania District Court dismissed plaintiff's case based on a statute of<br />

limitations and lack of causation grounds. 1991 U.S. District LEXIS 13561 (9/25/91).

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