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98 Chapter 7<br />

example of the kind of realist/institutional analysis of the case law<br />

that I have come to appreciate in Theunis’ work. 4<br />

But responding to Theunis has also been difficult: his chapter<br />

presents such a gleaming facade that I struggled to find a meaningful<br />

critical foothold. So I decided to respond by writing about two things<br />

that he does not say about democracy and South African<br />

constitutional law and a third that his not saying them suggests. First,<br />

I touch on what I see as a curiously limited conception of the scope<br />

and the nature of democracy-related constitutional duty that<br />

emerges from the case law Theunis analyses. Second, I write about<br />

the tension between democracy and the work of courts enforcing a<br />

justiciable constitution that haunts any positively stated<br />

constitutional principle of democracy. Third, I end by asking why<br />

Theunis did not write about these two issues and what the fact that<br />

he didn’t says about the democratic credentials of his chapter.<br />

2 What Theunis does not say<br />

2.1 Democracy as an empty vessel<br />

Theunis’ focus in his analysis of the case law is on the background<br />

conception of democracy that emerges from that case law and the<br />

question of whether that conception accords with the ‘thick’ principle<br />

of democracy he claims the Final Constitution envisages. When I read<br />

the same cases Theunis did I am struck by an obviously related, but<br />

different issue — the conception of constitutional duty that emerges<br />

from the cases.<br />

This conception, although it lurks in the background of NICRO, 5 DA<br />

v ANC, 6 Masondo, 7 and ACDP, 8 is stated most explicitly in NNP 9 and<br />

UDM. Quite apart from the thin rationality standard of review that he<br />

fashions in NNP (which Theunis bluntly and correctly describes as<br />

‘clearly wrong’), 10 Yacoob J in that case articulates a two-fold duty<br />

imposed on the state by the right to vote. First, he holds that the right<br />

4<br />

For another such example, see T Roux ‘Legitimating transformation: Political<br />

resource allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10<br />

Democratisation 92.<br />

5<br />

Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration<br />

of Offenders (NICRO) & Others 2005 3 SA 280 (CC), 2004 5 BCLR 445<br />

(CC).<br />

6<br />

Democratic Alliance v ANC & Others 2003 1 BCLR 25 (C).<br />

7 Democratic Alliance & Another v Masondo & Another 2003 2 SA 413 (CC), 2003 2<br />

BCLR 128 (CC).<br />

8<br />

African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission & Others 2006 3<br />

SA 305 (CC), 2006 5 BCLR 579 (CC).<br />

9 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 (3) SA 191<br />

(CC) 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC).<br />

10 Roux (n 1 above) 87.

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