04.06.2014 Views

Download this publication - PULP

Download this publication - PULP

Download this publication - PULP

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

12 Chapter 1<br />

democratic politics itself invariably result in some degree of<br />

instability in our conception of democracy?<br />

2.4 Application<br />

At the CLoSA Conference and Public Lecture Series, one of the<br />

editors, Professor Stu Woolman, limited his address to a theoretical<br />

critique of the Constitutional Court’s approach to direct application<br />

and indirect application of the Bill of Rights. (The primary question<br />

raised by application, for the uninitiated, concerns the parties that<br />

are and are not burdened by the specific substantive rights found in<br />

Chapter 2 of the Final Constitution.) And that remains the central<br />

purpose of his contribution to <strong>this</strong> collection. He argues that the<br />

Constitutional Court in Khumalo v Holomisa 22 — while acknowledging<br />

and endorsing the possibility of horizontal application under the Final<br />

Constitution — wilfully misread the wording of the application<br />

provisions in FC section 8 and that its five paragraphs on the subject<br />

are patently incoherent. Woolman meticulously roots out the textual<br />

errors in the Khumalo Court’s approach. He then demonstrates that<br />

even a good faith reconstruction of Khumalo cannot stand up to even<br />

the most generous scrutiny. In place of the good faith reconstruction,<br />

Woolman proffers a preferred reading of FC section 8 and FC section<br />

39(2) that makes sense of the division between direct application and<br />

indirect application of the Bill of Rights. This preferred reading —<br />

while still imperfect — makes the best possible sense of the<br />

Constitutional Assembly’s poorly drafted sections on direct<br />

application.<br />

Professor Iain Currie first notes that he had the unenviable task —<br />

especially given the constraints of a conference paper — of responding<br />

to Woolman’s long and theoretically ambitious contribution in<br />

Constitutional Law of South Africa. 23 Without immediately conceding<br />

anything regarding the merits of that contribution, Currie suggests<br />

that such ambition reflects an ‘old-fashioned’ model of academic<br />

discourse: And by ‘old-fashioned’, Currie simply means scholarship<br />

that engages carefully all of the available and relevant materials —<br />

the text, the judgments, and the work of fellow commentators. He<br />

then offers a brief historical summary of the debate over application,<br />

and notes how, under the Final Constitution, courts have been far less<br />

‘vexed’ by the relationship between direct application and indirect<br />

application than academics. Currie suggests that the reason for <strong>this</strong><br />

absence of engagement is that there is no practical difference<br />

between the two forms of application: Both approaches should<br />

22 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC), 2002 8 BCLR 771 (CC).<br />

23<br />

See S Woolman ‘Application’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South<br />

Africa (2nd Edition, OS, 2005) Chapter 31 (CD track 5).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!