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188 Chapter 11<br />

... or a means of frustrating the will of the political majority but, rather,<br />

as a shared project of constitutional interpretation. 3<br />

Woolman and Botha then commence to explain <strong>this</strong> shared project of<br />

constitutional interpretation with reference to four points that show<br />

that the relation of sharing involved here is one of more or less mutual<br />

deference: The legislature must allow the judiciary to declare a<br />

specific aspect of legislation unconstitutional, but the judiciary must<br />

from their side leave as much scope as possible to the legislature to<br />

select one of the many ways in which a legislative goal can be pursued<br />

without falling foul of the Constitution.<br />

One must nevertheless push <strong>this</strong> sophisticated understanding of<br />

shared constitutional interpretation to its limits in order to begin to<br />

explore that which lurks at and beyond these limits. What are the<br />

limits at issue here? Having invoked Sachs J’s notion of the maximum<br />

harmonisation of conflicting interests of the legislature and judiciary,<br />

Woolman and Botha also pay passing attention to Sachs J’s<br />

acknowledgment of the possibility of intractable conflicts between<br />

the judiciary and legislature in which the project of shared<br />

interpretation would sadly come to falter. This is however not the<br />

first invocation of the limits of interpretation in their text. In the<br />

rather optimistic passage on the notion of shared interpretation that<br />

I have quoted twice now, they also slip in between parentheses, as if<br />

it is a self-evident matter that only warrants a brief reminder, a<br />

reference to the possibility of the impossibility of <strong>this</strong> sharing. Let me<br />

quote <strong>this</strong> passage again, <strong>this</strong> time, fully in full:<br />

From <strong>this</strong> perspective, powers of judicial review are best understood,<br />

not as a part of a battle for ascendancy between courts and legislatures<br />

(though they may turn into that) or a means of frustrating the will of the<br />

political majority but, rather, as a shared project of constitutional<br />

interpretation. 4<br />

I would like to suggest that their whole text turns on an endeavour to<br />

indeed keep <strong>this</strong> ‘though they may turn into that’ in the<br />

unthreatening zone between these parentheses. The unproblematic<br />

and almost in passing fashion in which they later pay a little more<br />

attention to Sachs J’s reference to intractable conflicts between<br />

legislature and judiciary, 5 gives the whole invocation of<br />

‘intractability’ the quality of an aside. Here again, the almost in<br />

passing reference to intractability has the effect of diminishing its<br />

purport. This later invocation of Sachs J’s acknowledgement of<br />

intractability does not appear between parentheses as it does in the<br />

3 Woolman & Botha (n 1 above) 150.<br />

4<br />

As above.<br />

5 Woolman & Botha (n 1 above) 180.

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