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Stu Woolman & Henk Botha 167<br />
legal principles, a problem-solving perspective implements each set<br />
of solutions tentatively and is ready to modify these rolling normative<br />
guidelines on the basis of empirical evidence. 37 The experimentalist<br />
approach calls for mechanisms that compare the information<br />
generated by different proposals and that allow for the adoption of<br />
successful solutions.<br />
Of course, courts called upon to perform limitations analysis<br />
cannot avoid conflicts that are not susceptible to deliberative<br />
solutions. Here again experimental constitutionalism offers the<br />
additional idea of provisional adjudication. Provisional adjudication<br />
puts alternative possible remedies to the test of experience without<br />
necessarily elevating such remedies to the level of established<br />
doctrine. Provisional adjudication promises two additional benefits.<br />
First. It may facilitate compromise. 38 Affected parties may learn from<br />
practical experience and adjust their beliefs and conduct accordingly.<br />
Second. It gives parties that may have been aggrieved with a final<br />
non-provisional outcome the opportunity to experiment with a<br />
remedy of their own making.<br />
But suppose that such provisional space fails to yield a desirable<br />
— let us say, from the view of the state — outcome. A finding of<br />
unconstitutionality generally still leaves the legislature free to pursue<br />
the same objectives, but requires it to use means that better fit — are<br />
more narrowly tailored to — constitutional imperatives. It is,<br />
therefore, clear that the courts do not have the final word on the<br />
meaning of the constitutional text in two very important respects.<br />
First, just as the legislature must pay heed to the Court’s reasons for<br />
a finding of unconstitutionality when offering a new formulation of a<br />
law, so too must the Court demonstrate discernible deference to the<br />
legislature’s reformulation. The very fact of a limitations clause in our<br />
Bill of Rights demands that the courts give the coordinate branches of<br />
37 See M Dorf ‘Legal indeterminism and institutional design’ (2004) 78 New York<br />
University Law Review 875 920-935 and 960-70.<br />
38<br />
See eg Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street<br />
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). Prior to handing down<br />
its decision, the Constitutional Court issued an order requiring the parties to the<br />
dispute to engage meaningfully with each other with a view to addressing the<br />
possibilities of short-term steps to improve current living conditions and of<br />
alternative accommodation for those who would be rendered homeless. As a<br />
result of <strong>this</strong> interim order, the parties reached a consensus that the City of<br />
Johannesburg would not eject the occupiers, that it would upgrade the buildings<br />
and that it would provide temporary accommodation. In addition, the parties<br />
agreed to meet and discuss permanent housing solutions. This agreement was<br />
then ratified by an order of the Constitutional Court. That consensus decision<br />
about the optimal remedy left the Court free to articulate general norms about<br />
the right to access to adequate housing: (1) evictions cannot occur in the absence<br />
of meaningful engagement; (2) the potential for homelessness must be considered<br />
prior to any decision by a state actor to eliminate unsafe buildings. While<br />
an experimental constitutionalist could generally ask for little more, one problem<br />
with the judgment is its failure to provide ‘new’ rolling norms with teeth.