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Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt 247<br />

3.3.2 The Poor<br />

Interestingly, one of the most marginal groups in our society, the<br />

poor, have not approached courts with equality cases requiring<br />

positive state action to meet their basic needs. The majority of unfair<br />

discrimination cases have been brought by middle class applicants.<br />

(Although some of the cases have argued for improved benefits that<br />

would assist the poor within that disadvantaged group (Jordan 113 and<br />

Volks).) 114 As discussed above, 115 Khosa 116 concerned the rights of<br />

non-citizens living in poverty to state support. But thus far, no-one<br />

has come to court to argue that they are unfairly treated by virtue of<br />

their membership of a disadvantaged group of poor people. PEPUDA<br />

includes socio-economic status as a ground to be considered for<br />

inclusion in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. One would<br />

hope that the next decade will witness cases brought by or on behalf<br />

of people who have been left behind during the sustained period of<br />

growth over the past decade. 117 Our equality right seems capable of<br />

assisting them if the Court’s jurisprudence is properly applied.<br />

3.3.3 Intersectionality<br />

Other jurisdictions have struggled with the development of a method<br />

for dealing with claims based on a range of different grounds.<br />

Crenshaw has explained the problems of an unsophisticated approach<br />

by what she terms ‘intersectionality’ and shows how disadvantage<br />

suffered by a black woman constitutes a separate category of<br />

discrimination that is greater than, and different from, the individual<br />

claims of race or gender discrimination made on behalf of white<br />

women or black men. 118 A contextual approach requires that<br />

different layers of disadvantage be unpacked and addressed in their<br />

full complexity. Our Constitutional Court has not properly dealt with<br />

<strong>this</strong> issue (NCGLE v Home Affairs 119 and Moseneke). 120 Still, it has<br />

managed to assist groups where a number of possible grounds exist.<br />

The Court has correctly adopted the expansive view that as long as<br />

113 n 12 above.<br />

114 n 62 above.<br />

115<br />

See 2.1.1 above.<br />

116 n 14 above.<br />

117 See S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt ‘The interrelationship between equality and<br />

socio-economic rights under South Africa’s transformative constitution’ (2007) 23<br />

South African Journal on Human Rights 335. for a discussion of poverty/class as a<br />

ground of unfair discrimination.<br />

118<br />

K Crenshaw ‘Demarginalising the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist<br />

critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics’<br />

(1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139. See also N Iyer ‘Categorical<br />

denials: Equality rights and the shaping of social identity’ (1993) 19 Queen’s Law<br />

Journal 179.<br />

119 n 18 above, para 40. Sachs J gave more detailed attention to the issue in his<br />

separate concurring judgment, paras 112-113.<br />

120 n 40 above, para 30.

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