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Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt 253<br />

social, economic and political context in which the impugned action<br />

occurs, and on its impact on the complainant.<br />

FC section 36 embraces a different type of enquiry. It measures<br />

the finding of fairness against a range of defences and justifications<br />

offered by the state, within a balancing of rights and values. 146<br />

Despite the failure of the Court to distinguish unfair discrimination<br />

analysis from proportionality analysis, we believe that a relatively<br />

clear distinction between FC section 9(3) and FC section 36 exists. In<br />

particular, questions of resources, administrative capacity or<br />

alternative mechanisms of achieving the same end should only enter<br />

the Court’s enquiry under FC section 36.<br />

In practice, the Court has yet to find an incident of unfair<br />

discrimination in terms of FC section 9 justifiable in terms of FC<br />

section 36. 147 Nevertheless, FC section 36 remains a critical part of<br />

the new constitutional culture of accountability and justification. In<br />

Khosa v Minister of Social Development, 148 the Constitutional Court<br />

found that the denial of social assistance constituted unfair<br />

discrimination that was not justified under FC section 36. In doing so,<br />

it demonstrated that it would carefully scrutinise the justifications<br />

offered by government and measure these against the nature of the<br />

right. Two points stand out. Firstly, the significance that the Court<br />

attached to the right: the denial of social assistance constituted a<br />

total deprivation of ‘what may be essential to enable [the applicants]<br />

to enjoy other rights vested in them in the Constitution’, by<br />

implication finding the nature of the right to be foundational. 149<br />

Secondly, the fact that the discrimination was not justified even<br />

though it would impose an additional cost burden on the state. In<br />

weighing up the government’s financial justifications, the Court found<br />

that although there was no definitive evidence of the cost, the<br />

available evidence revealed that the inclusion of the category of<br />

persons represented by the applicants would not incur more than a<br />

two percent increase over current costs. Given that a seventy percent<br />

146 FC sec 36 reads as follows:<br />

The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of<br />

general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and<br />

justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,<br />

equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including:<br />

(a)the nature of the right;<br />

(b)the importance of the purpose of the limitation;<br />

(c)the nature and extent of the limitation;<br />

(d)the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and<br />

(e)less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.<br />

147<br />

But see the minority judgment of Ngcobo J in Bhe (n 17 above).<br />

148 n 14 above. In <strong>this</strong> case the justification enquiry was woven into the overall set of<br />

considerations before the Court. This summary extracts what appears to have<br />

been applicable to the finding that the unfair discrimination was not justified.<br />

149 Khosa (n 14 above) para 77.

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