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176 Chapter 10<br />

5.3 Democracy and openness<br />

5.3.1 Principle of democracy<br />

Cases such as Khosa 70 — which stressed the political community’s<br />

responsibility to provide non-citizens who find themselves on the<br />

margins of that community with the material conditions for agency —<br />

and Fourie 71 — which recognised that gays and lesbians have an<br />

entitlement to public recognition of their intimate relationships —<br />

evince the Court’s transformation of its dignity-based approach to<br />

fundamental rights interpretation and limitations analysis from<br />

dignitas and a narrow conception of the public interest to something<br />

far more expansive, if not all-embracing. This far more substantive<br />

vision of dignity allows us to make sense of a variety of other<br />

constitutional values precisely because <strong>this</strong> conception of dignity<br />

embraces such notions as equal concern and equal respect, selfactualisation,<br />

self-governance, and collective responsibility for the<br />

material means required for agency.<br />

But what the Court has still not done is give distinctive content to<br />

each of the five values enshrined in FC section 36. For the most part,<br />

the Court has viewed the four other values through the lens of human<br />

dignity. According to the Court, dignity provides a common measure<br />

of value which can help bridge the division between equality and<br />

freedom, or between negative and positive rights, or between the<br />

individual and collective aspects of our autonomy. However, we have<br />

also seen that dignity does not adequately address all conflicts nor<br />

does a reliance on dignity appear to do adequate justice to those outgroups<br />

whose participation in our social and political life remains<br />

marginal at best.<br />

It is particularly surprising that the Constitutional Court has not<br />

done more to develop the meaning of ‘openness’ and ‘democracy’ —<br />

two features of our society that clearly demarcate the boundary<br />

between apartheid South Africa and post-apartheid South Africa. In<br />

our view, a greater elaboration of the meaning of ‘an open and<br />

democratic society’, and a closer connection of these values to<br />

dignity (especially dignity qua self-governance), might result in a<br />

jurisprudence more inclined to accommodate plurality and<br />

difference. Similarly, an engagement with ‘democracy’ might<br />

strengthen our commitment to securing spaces in which ‘counterpublics’<br />

can challenge dominant ideas and engage in alternative<br />

discourses. In <strong>this</strong> section, we consider the possibility of a<br />

complementary understanding of the values underlying the Bill of<br />

70<br />

Khosa (n 60 above).<br />

71 Fourie (n 14 above).

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