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240 Chapter 14<br />

interpretation of the provision. Their starting point was to ‘consider<br />

whether there is a constitutionally compatible interpretation of the<br />

section’ that the provision is ‘reasonably capable of bearing’. 44<br />

The majority took a more staid approach. It looked at what had<br />

been generally accepted in our law; the natural reading of the<br />

section; and the context of the enactment of the provision. 45 In<br />

finding that the provision did differentiate between sex worker and<br />

client, the Court also sought to avoid a broadening of the definition<br />

of the crime (so as to include the client in its ambit), a task that<br />

ordinarily fell to the legislature and not the Court. The Court<br />

concluded that it would be contrary to constitutional values, including<br />

the principle of legality, to accept the extended definition. 46<br />

In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of<br />

Home Affairs, 47 the state contended that the exclusion of gay and<br />

lesbian partners from benefits was not discrimination based on sexual<br />

orientation but on the fact that these partners were ‘non-spouses’. In<br />

response to <strong>this</strong> line of argument, the Court said that the question of<br />

whether there has been differentiation on a specified or unspecified<br />

ground has to be determined objectively 48 and contextually, and with<br />

the experience of those affected by it in mind. 49 In <strong>this</strong> case the<br />

enquiry was a substantive one that went beyond the form of the<br />

disputed law to determine its impact on the complainants. This closer<br />

inspection involves an interrogation of the assumptions and stereotypes<br />

about ‘spouse’ and ‘family’ that underpinned the respondent’s<br />

challenge, as well as how these affected gay and lesbian people.<br />

Before <strong>this</strong> case, the stage of proving discrimination was a relatively<br />

mechanical one in the Court. This case suggests that the stage of<br />

proving discrimination could yet become a far more substantive<br />

enquiry than has, thus far, been the case.<br />

In contrast, Jordan v The State demonstrates the difference<br />

between a mechanical and more substantial approach to<br />

understanding the relationship between differentiation/discrimination<br />

and the stated ground. Unlike the enquiry in National Coalition<br />

for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, the Jordan<br />

majority fails to interrogate the relationship between the<br />

differentiation in section 20(1)(aA) and ‘gender’ and finds no<br />

discrimination on the basis of gender. 50 The more substantial and<br />

detailed enquiry of the minority, which is more faithful to the<br />

44 Jordan (n 12 above) para 40.<br />

45 Jordan (n 12 above) paras 41–44.<br />

46<br />

Jordan (n 12 above) para 45–46.<br />

47 NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs (n 18 above).<br />

48 Harksen (n 9 above) para 48.<br />

49<br />

See NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs (n 18 above) para 35.<br />

50 Jordan (n 12 above) paras 8-14.

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