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Stu Woolman 207<br />

Human ... dignity informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation<br />

at a range of levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many,<br />

possibly all, other rights ... Human dignity is also a constitutional value<br />

that is of central significance in the limitations analysis. Section 10,<br />

however, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to<br />

our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be<br />

respected and protected. In many cases however, where the value of<br />

human dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach occasioned<br />

may be of a more specific right such as the right to bodily integrity, the<br />

right to equality or the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or<br />

forced labour. 36<br />

So, just as dignity denotes at least five different kinds of obligation,<br />

so too does dignity operate within our legal system in four sundry<br />

ways.<br />

4.1 Dignity as a first order rule<br />

The right to dignity rarely operates a first order rule. That is, the right<br />

to dignity alone is rarely dispositive of a constitutional matter. The<br />

first rule of South African dignity jurisprudence is that where a court<br />

can identify the infringement of a more specific right, FC section 10<br />

will (ostensibly) not add to the enquiry. That said, dignity has<br />

operated as a first order rule in a number of important corporal<br />

punishment and intimate association matters.<br />

In corporal punishment or capital punishment cases such as<br />

Williams 37 and Makwanyane, 38 the Constitutional Court has found<br />

that the punishment reduces the individual to a mere cipher and fails<br />

to recognise the individual as an end-in-herself. In Dawood and<br />

Booysen, the Constitutional Court found that no other specific<br />

substantive right would protect the co-habitation interests of the<br />

married couples or life partners in question and that the failure to<br />

protect such intimate associations failed to recognise both the<br />

individual as an end-in herself and the individual as capable of selfactualisation.<br />

39<br />

36 Dawood (n 12 above) para 35.<br />

37 S v Williams & Others 1995 3 SA 632 (CC), 1995 7 BCLR 861 (CC).<br />

38<br />

S v Makwanyane (n 3 above).<br />

39 See Dawood (n 12 above); Booysen v Minister of Home Affairs & Another 2001 4<br />

SA 485 (CC), 2001 7 BCLR 645 (CC). See also Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331<br />

(CC), 2004 6 BCLR 735 (CC) (Moseneke J dissenting). High Courts have extended<br />

the protection that FC section 10 affords intimate association beyond the<br />

confines of marriage or life partnerships to relationships between grandparents<br />

and grandchildren. See Petersen v Maintenance Officer, Simon’s Town 2004 2 SA<br />

56 (C), 2004 2 BCLR 205 (C). High Courts have also deployed dignity as an<br />

operational rule when no other right would protect the linguistic interests of a<br />

party before the court. See S v Pienaar 2000 7 BCLR 800 (NC) para 10; Advance<br />

Mining Hydraulics v Botes NO 2000 1 SA 815 (T), 2000 2 BCLR 119 (T) 127.

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