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236 Chapter 14<br />

social exclusion, 17 the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes, 18 and<br />

political vulnerability. 19<br />

In the end, the value of dignity — manifest in the notion of equal<br />

moral worth and the requirement that all persons be treated with<br />

equal concern and respect — is a malleable concept. It easily<br />

embraces ideas of status or recognition that are implicated in the<br />

majority of equality (unfair discrimination) cases. Here the value of<br />

dignity evinces a constitutional concern with the equal moral worth<br />

of persons and groups, with their inclusion and participation within<br />

society as equals, without stereotyping, prejudice and isolation. The<br />

relationship of the value of dignity to ideas of material disadvantage<br />

is apparent, although, as we noted above, thus far limited in its<br />

application to concrete cases. In equality cases, <strong>this</strong> conception of<br />

dignity has only been employed where the underlying inequality is<br />

supported by a violation of a socio-economic right. 20 The cases<br />

demonstrate that while dignity is capable of supporting a substantive<br />

understanding of equality that explores and seeks to remedy systemic<br />

inequalities and disadvantage, other uses of dignity, often combined<br />

with legal formalism, prevent a substantive understanding of<br />

equality. 21<br />

Rather trenchant criticisms of dignity — and its relationship to<br />

equality — have been made with regard to Canadian jurisprudence.<br />

Canadian scholars have shown that the courts’ reliance on dignity<br />

focuses on whether a person or group has been treated with ‘equal<br />

concern and respect’, and fails to test whether particular goals of<br />

substantive equality have been achieved. 22<br />

17 Bhe & Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others; Shibi v Sithole & Others;<br />

SAHRC & Another v President v President of the RSA & Another 2005 1 SA 580<br />

(CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) in relation to the customary rule of primogeniture. See<br />

further Albertyn & Goldblatt (n 16 above) 35-10—35-12.<br />

18 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2<br />

SA 1 (CC), 2000 1 BCLR 39 (CC) paras 45–53.<br />

19 Larbi-Odam & Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-<br />

West Province) & Another 1998 1 SA 745 (CC), 1997 12 BCLR 1655 (CC) in respect<br />

of access to economic opportunities (teaching posts).<br />

20 For a discussion of <strong>this</strong> idea of dignity in relation to socio-economic rights, see S<br />

Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity’ (n 11 above). For a discussion of the<br />

relationship between equality and socio-economic rights, see S Fredman<br />

‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to provide’ (2005)<br />

21 South African Journal on Human Rights 163; Goldblatt & Liebenberg (n 3<br />

above).<br />

21 See C Albertyn ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23<br />

South African Journal on Human Rights 253; Woolman (n 5 above) § 36.4<br />

22<br />

See, eg, C Sheppard ‘Inclusive equality and new forms of social governance’<br />

(2004) 24 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 45; S Moreau ‘The wrongs of unequal<br />

treatment’ (2004) 54 University of Toronto Law Journal 291; J Fudge ‘Substantive<br />

equality, the Supreme Court of Canada and the limits to redistribution’ (2007) 23<br />

South African Journal on Human Rights 235.

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