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Reply - Karthy Govender 261<br />

that the unfairness analysis requires an assessment of the nature of<br />

the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it, is<br />

that the proportionality analysis, which is the essence of the<br />

limitation clause, is now important in deciding whether the right has<br />

been violated. Based upon the facts of Hugo — which turned on<br />

conduct and not law — the Court was not able to rely on the limitation<br />

clause and hence the concept of ‘unfairness’ was expanded. Section<br />

14 of PEPUDA, in recognition of <strong>this</strong> difficulty, has further extended<br />

the definition of unfairness to incorporate the limitation clause<br />

enquiry. 19<br />

3.1 Minister of Education v Harris<br />

In Minister of Education v Harris, a regulation increasing the school<br />

admission age to 7 was challenged on the basis that it unfairly<br />

discriminated on the prohibited ground of age against a learner<br />

attending an independent school who was prepared and ready for<br />

school at the age of 6, which was the previous age for admission. 20<br />

The regulation sought to bring the age admission requirements of<br />

private schools in line with that of state schools. From the perspective<br />

of the applicant learner and the independent school that she<br />

attended, there were no sound reasons for not allowing her to start<br />

school when she was ready to do so. Denying her admission would,<br />

according to expert testimony, adversely affect her. The school had<br />

no reason, other than the departmental regulation, for refusing her<br />

admission until she turned 7. As the unfairness enquiry focuses on the<br />

impact of the regulation on the complainant, the Department of<br />

Education in Harris would have had serious difficulties in<br />

demonstrating that the discrimination was fair, even if regard is had<br />

to the objectives of the regulations. 21<br />

Given the circumstances of <strong>this</strong> case, the national Department of<br />

Education was more likely to justify their regulation under the general<br />

limitation clause than prove that it did not unfairly discriminate<br />

against <strong>this</strong> particular learner. Having different age admission<br />

requirements in independent and state schools would give learners<br />

from independent schools a distinct advance and accentuate the<br />

differences between the two systems. Thus, under the limitation<br />

19 Whether the inclusion of justification criteria at the fairness stage is good law<br />

was recently questioned by the Constitutional Court in MEC for Education:<br />

KwaZulu-Natal & Others v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC) para 70.<br />

20 Harris v Minister of Education 2001 8 BCLR 796 (T). The Constitutional Court<br />

decided the case without considering the equality question. Minister of Education<br />

v Harris 2001 4 SA 1297 (CC), 2001 11 BCLR 1157 (CC).<br />

21 However, as Stu Woolman notes, one of the myriad problems in Harris was that<br />

the DoE failed to provide any evidence that would justify the discrimination. See<br />

S Woolman ‘Freedom of Association’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law<br />

of South Africa (2nd Edition, OS, 2003) Chapter 44.

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