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238 Chapter 14<br />

institutionalised under-privilege’. 32 This commitment required remedial<br />

or restitutionary equality. 33 Although the Van Heerden Court does<br />

not use the term ‘redistribution’, its interpretation of the value of<br />

equality clearly envisages a degree of economic redistribution and the<br />

removal of material disparities.<br />

2.2.3 Values, purpose and the parameters of the equality right<br />

Read across a series of cases, and in the context of our history, the<br />

purpose of the equality right can be seen to promote a society where<br />

each person is accorded equal moral worth, and in which systemic<br />

inequality and disadvantage are eradicated and substantive equality<br />

is actively promoted. The value of dignity continues to play the<br />

central role in relation to unfair discrimination and its meaning has<br />

(sometimes) been broadened to include issues of group disadvantage<br />

and material well-being. The value of equality is more dominant in<br />

the Court’s interpretation of the positive aspects of the right under<br />

FC section 9(2). In relation to both unfair discrimination and positive<br />

measures, the Court’s embrace of the redistributive aspects of<br />

equality has been supported by the presence of underlying rights in<br />

the Final Constitution (the right to social assistance in Khosa) or in<br />

legislation (the Maintenance Act in Bannatyne and the Political Office<br />

Bearers Pension Fund in Van Heerden).<br />

However, a redistributive function does not always fit<br />

comfortably with the institutional role of courts and with the<br />

distinction the courts seek to draw between issues of social policy and<br />

issues of law. 34 It is perhaps for <strong>this</strong> reason that the Constitutional<br />

Court initially turned to the more comfortable terrain of dignity to<br />

define and to guide the application of the equality right. However, it<br />

is through giving substantive meaning to the values of dignity and<br />

equality that the Court has begun to develop an equality<br />

jurisprudence that is flexible in its response to different kinds of<br />

claims, and that is able to address questions of individual moral worth<br />

and group-based social and economic disadvantage.<br />

3 Evaluation of unfair discrimination jurisprudence<br />

The early cases of unfair discrimination involved the gradual<br />

development of the jurisprudence and led to the crystallisation of a<br />

comprehensive test for unfair discrimination in Harksen. 35<br />

32 n 31 above, para 31.<br />

33<br />

n 31 above, para 30 and paras 73-74 (Mokgoro J).<br />

34 See, eg, NCGLE v Minister of Justice (n 12 above) para 123 (Sachs J expressed<br />

concerns in his minority judgement in relation to ‘over-intrusive judicial<br />

intervention in matters of broad social policy’.)<br />

35 n 9 above.

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