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214 Chapter 12<br />

the Constitutional Court permitted a Berlian understanding of<br />

negative liberty to slip into the Court’s equality jurisprudence<br />

through the backdoor of dignity. 61 The Ferreira Court rejected<br />

Justice Ackermann’s view that IC section 11(1) and FC section 12(1)<br />

required that ‘freedom’ and ‘security of the person’ should be read<br />

disjunctively and that IC section 11(1) and FC section 12(1) contained<br />

a robust freedom right. 62 However, in a number of cases decided<br />

shortly after Ferreira, the Court appeared to accept Justice<br />

Ackermann’s contention that there exists an inextricable link<br />

between dignity and the need for individual freedom from state<br />

intervention. In Hugo, the Court places ‘dignity ... at the heart of<br />

individual rights in a free and democratic society.’ 63 In National<br />

Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, the Court<br />

states that ‘it is clear that the constitutional protection of dignity<br />

requires us to acknowledge the value and the worth of all individuals<br />

as members of society.’ 64 Thus, over the course of several cases and<br />

the space of a couple of years, individual freedom qua negative<br />

liberty becomes the foundation for dignity, and dignity, in turn,<br />

becomes the basis for equality.<br />

One can accept the truth of the proposition that the<br />

Constitutional Court accepted the link between dignity and the need<br />

for individual freedom from state intervention without accepting the<br />

proposition that dignity is only about the need for individual freedom<br />

from state intervention. For example, Amartya Sen ties his notion of<br />

‘development as freedom’ to the provision of a basic basket of goods<br />

— both real and figurative — that enable human beings to develop<br />

those ‘capabilities’ necessary for each individual to achieve those<br />

ends that each has reason to value. 65 Sen contends that dignity and<br />

freedom and equality, rightly understood, are meant neither to<br />

achieve definitive outcomes nor to prescribe a univocal understanding<br />

of the good. 66 What these covalent values do require is a level of<br />

61 D Davis ‘Equality: The majesty of legoland jurisprudence’ (1999) 116 South<br />

African Law Journal 398.<br />

62 Ferreira (n 20 above).<br />

63 Hugo (n 17 above) para 41.<br />

64 n 21 above, para 28.<br />

65 61<br />

See D Davis Sen (n‘Equality: 33 above); The A Sen majesty Inequality of legoland re-examined jurisprudence’ (1992). (1999) 116 South<br />

66 Sen African asks Law us Journal to take 398. account, in any theory of distributive justice, of how the<br />

62<br />

heterogeneity Ferreira (n 20 above). amongst individuals (both within societies and across societies)<br />

63<br />

shapes Hugo (n the 16 meaning above) para of primary 41. goods and incomes. For example, the meaning of a<br />

64<br />

primary n 21 above, political para good 28. like freedom of assembly will have demonstrably different<br />

65<br />

meanings See Sen (n for 33 a above); prson who A Sen is Inequality ambulatory re-examined and for a person (1992). who is not ambulatory,<br />

66<br />

but such housebound. primary goods Similarly, as income the or civil utility liberties of an into income the capability of R200 ‘to 000 choose will a have life<br />

demonstrably one has reason different to value’ value — or for in a simpler person who terms, is ambulatory the ability and to pursue for a person one’s own who<br />

is ends. not ambulatory, Sen (n 27 above) but housebound. 75. The virtue At a of minimum, Sen’s approach says Sen, is that quoting it recognises Adam Smith, (a)<br />

our the heterogeneity primary concern of capacity ought to that be providing people possess individuals by virtue with of those biology, necessities custom, or of<br />

life class; that (b) will, the in heterogeneity fact, give them of ‘“the critical ability functions to appear — from in public nourishment without shame”.’ to civic<br />

Sen participation (n 27 above) — that 73 quoting may be required A Smith The to live wealth a life of one nations has reason (1776) to RH value; Campbell and (c) &<br />

AS the Skinner heterogeneity (ed) (1976) of 469-471. capabilities That, that in just people a few will well-chosen possess words, — different sounds<br />

very combinations much like of South more African basic functions discourse — on which dignity. will, Sen in contends turn, enable that them best to<br />

measure pursue different of equality visions or freedom of the good. or dignity is the ability of individuals to convert

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